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Introduction 
This dissertation consists of three independent chapters that study how to improve public 
policies and reduce the level of social injustice through the lens of microeconomics and the 
innovative use of new data sets. In the first chapter, I test the impact of neighborhood 
heterogeneity on the private contribution of local public goods. Using a panel data set 
containing over two million non-emergency service requests and detailed census-tract level 
data on socioeconomic characteristics from the American Community Survey, I find that, 
contrary to the prevailing view in the literature, racial and linguistic heterogeneity have 
little to no negative effect on private voluntary contributions to local public goods. Income 
inequality, on the other hand, reduces private contributions by a significant margin. In the 
second chapter, my coauthors and I examine how job transfer rules and preferences affect 
labor market efficiency and access to quality teachers. To do so, we recover teacher and 
school preferences using data from Minneapolis Public Schools’ web-based internal 
teacher labor market. Overall, we find that the average teacher prefers schools serving 
already-advantaged students and the average school prefers applicants who are more 
effective, hold an advanced degree, and not in their early-career. These preferences help 
explain why we observe the troubling sorting patterns among teachers and suggest that 
further liberalizing the teacher labor market may exacerbate the inequitable distribution of 
quality teachers. Finally, the third chapter evaluates a hidden social cost of air pollution 
beyond hospital admissions and premature deaths: student achievement. Given the strength 
of evidence linking academic performance to long-term life outcomes and the fact that 
disadvantaged and marginalized communities tend to get more exposure to air pollution, 
this additional cost should be identified and quantified correctly. Using an exogenous 
source of variation in the levels of air pollution from the closure of an airport terminal, I 
find that the closure led to a roughly 2 percent of a standard deviation increase in high-
stakes test scores. 
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Chapter 1: 
Heterogeneity and the Private Contribution of Local Public Goods: Evidence from 
NYC311 
I. Introduction:   
 The United States is on the verge of a diversity explosion. The United States Census 
Bureau projected that the US will become a country with no racial majority by 2044 (Frey 
2014). The trajectory of the level of heterogeneity in the income dimension is equally 
striking. From 1980 to 2014, the top 1 percent adults went from accounting for 12 percent 
of national income to over 20 percent while the bottom 50 percent adults saw their national 
income share drop from 20 percent to 12 percent (Piketty et al. 2016). New York City 
(NYC), America’s densest city and historically an important port of entry for immigrants, 
has been at the forefront of this diversity explosion. Roughly 38 percent of NYC residents 
are now foreign-born (United States Census Bureau 2015). On average, there is a fifty 
percent chance that two randomly selected NYC residents will belong to different racial 
groups and speak different languages at home. The Gini coefficient in NYC is also among 
the highest (United States Census Bureau 2015). In Manhattan, income inequality is 
comparable to the levels in Brazil and Colombia.  
Social scientists have long debated whether heterogeneity is good for society. The 
literature remains inconclusive at best as to whether there is a net societal benefit from 
having a high level of urban heterogeneity. Some empirical studies support the Jacobs 
(1969) hypothesis that urban heterogeneity offers a more favorable environment for 
economic development (Ejermo 2005; Glaeser et al. 1992). On the other hand, Putnam 
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(2007) points to diversity as the main culprit for reducing social capital in US cities. In his 
view, too much diversity can erode trust and may exacerbate collective action problems. 
Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999)’s finding that ethnic fragmentation hampers the 
provision of public goods in the US started an entirely new empirical literature that would 
eventually discover other negative effects of ethnic heterogeneity such as conflicts 
(Reynal-Querol and Montalvo 2005) and economic underdevelopment (Alesina et al. 
2003). Studies in experimental economics find that even the private provision (or private 
contribution) of public goods can be negatively affected by heterogeneity (Chan et al. 
1999). While there is no consensus on the net societal benefit of heterogeneity, recent 
findings indicate that there is a negative relationship between heterogeneity and both the 
public and private provision of public goods. 
Against the backdrop of high level of heterogeneity found in modern cities and the 
prevailing view of its effect on public goods provision, testing for and understanding the 
relationship between heterogeneity and the private contribution of local public goods 
(hereinafter referred to as “private contributions”) in a context outside of a laboratory 
setting is the objective of this paper. In particular, I estimate the effects of heterogeneity 
on citizens’ propensity to make non-emergency service requests in NYC that benefit not 
only the contactor but also his or her neighbors. Each year between 2005 and 2014, the 
NYC311 call center handled over 1 million requests and complaints about the quality of 
local public goods ranging from traffic signal problems to noise complaints. Citizens can 
make requests to NYC311 by calling the number 311, reporting online, or using the 
NYC311 mobile applications. The various departments within the city then rely on this 
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database that stores information about the type of request, exact location, and time of 
request to locate and restore the quality of the reported local public goods in a timely 
manner. Thus, citizen participation in NYC311 translates indirectly to the production or 
the restoration of local public goods. I view this action as an economic agent voluntarily 
contributing to a local public good. 
To estimate the impact of heterogeneity on private contributions, I construct a 
census tract by month panel data set from 2005 to 2014 containing information on the 
frequency and type of service requests, the various measures of heterogeneity, and the 
socioeconomic characteristics of NYC residents. For my dependent variables, I carefully 
select the types of requests, geocode, and aggregate more than 2 million service requests 
to the month level by request type for each census tract. Then, I link these data with the 
heterogeneity measures and other control variables constructed from two rounds of the 
American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates: 2005-2009 and 2010-2014.  
Identifying the effect of heterogeneity on the propensity to make service requests 
is challenging since not all problems with local public goods are observed and they are not 
always random across geographical areas and time. Some areas may have higher needs and 
some areas may receive better treatment from the city. To address these estimation issues, 
I employ three empirical strategies. First, I focus my analysis only on the types of requests 
whose causes are exogenous given my econometric specification and which are unlikely 
to be requested by nonresidents. Second, I exploit the panel nature of the data set and 
employ a two-period fixed effects model using both the census tract-specific and time fixed 
effects. I also include a rich set of time-varying control variables to address other potential 
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confounders such as tastes for public goods, mobility, and service completion time. With 
the first two strategies, the level of need to contact NYC311 across geographical areas and 
time should be adequately controlled for and the occurrence rate at which of these public 
goods incidents happen should be as good as random. Third, I instrument income inequality 
to address concerns about measurement errors and reverse causality. In survey data like the 
ACS, measurement errors can be large, and fixed effects models with slow-moving 
variables can exacerbate attenuation bias. Moreover, it could be that it is the change in the 
quality of local public goods that leads to the change in income inequality, not the other 
way around. Richer residents may choose to relocate to areas with better public goods 
(areas requiring few 311 requests), mechanically changing the level of income inequality 
both at the origin and the destination. Three instruments are used to address these concerns. 
They are the fraction of households in the top income bracket, the fraction of workers in 
the information industry, and the fraction of workers in the public sector for each census 
tract in 2000, several years before the two rounds of ACS. The intuition is that the income 
of top earners and workers in the information industry grew disproportionately faster over 
time, while the income of workers in the public sector should not be as affected by the 
national patterns of income growth or by the Great Recession as was the income of workers 
in private industries. By freezing these fractions in 2000, I foreclose the possibility that the 
quality of local public goods causes the change in income inequality by attracting new 
residents. Given a rich set of controls, these instruments should not affect service requests 
except through income inequality.  
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Overall, I find little to no evidence that racial and linguistic heterogeneity reduce 
private contributions. While the estimates are mostly negative across multiple 
specifications, they are generally neither statistically different from zero nor economically 
significant. One reason is that they are highly correlated with income inequality and other 
socio-demographic variables. In all of my specifications, income inequality is negatively 
associated with private contributions. My preferred IV estimate suggests that a 0.01 point 
increase in the Gini coefficient—roughly the same magnitude that the average Gini 
coefficient changed over a five-year period in NYC— in an area reduces private 
contributions by roughly 2.5 percent. This effect is robust to a number of alternative 
specifications, including using a different set of request types as the dependent variable 
and running the model over each round of the ACS separately. Median household income 
and population are negatively associated with private contributions but their effects tend to 
be economically insignificant.  
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, this paper is the first to use the 311 
service request data to study the private contribution of local public goods. Unlike recent 
studies that focus on the geographical distribution of government services (Levine and 
Gershenson 2014; Feigenbaum and Hall 2015), on predicting public goods problems 
(Hsieh, Yen, and Li 2015), or on the determinants of neighborhood conflicts (Legewie and 
Schaeffer 2016), I present a set of empirical strategies that allow researchers to treat service 
requests as an act of private contribution of local public goods. This opens a wide range of 
possibilities for future research in the areas of public economics as more cities adopt the 
311 system and open their data sets to researchers. Particularly, the 311 context offers 
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several advantages over other types of observational data. Because there is no explicit 
economic incentive for citizens to make service requests other than the utility from the 
problem being resolved as a result of the call and the disutility of effort, the observed 
voluntary contribution is independent of other potential monetary factors that play a key 
role in studies that treat charitable donations, gifts, and political contributions as measures 
of private contributions to public goods (Andreoni and Payne 2013).  
Second, this paper adds new insight and depth to the literature on the relationship 
between heterogeneity and public goods provision. One reason why my results run counter 
to the prevailing view in the literature is that the local public goods selected in this paper 
do not have the redistributive properties and they have little to do with the differing tastes 
among heterogeneous populations. In other words, racial and linguistic heterogeneity does 
not reduce private contributions in this context where taste and redistribution are unlikely 
to be important. Rather, it is income inequality that lowers private contributions. This result 
illustrates the danger of over-generalizing the prevailing theme in the literature to all types 
of public goods. 
Finally, this paper makes a contribution to the ongoing debate about the underlying 
mechanism behind the relationship between heterogeneity and private contribution. 
Currently, the mechanisms are not well understood and often are impossible to pinpoint 
outside controlled public goods games (Habyarimana et al. 2007). The specific nature of 
how service requests are made through the NYC311 system presents a rare opportunity to 
identify the underlying mechanism. Because making service requests is free and the local 
public goods studied in this paper do not have redistributive properties, most traditional 
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explanations of why income inequality would affect private contributions are ruled out. 
Due to the nature of how service requests are made and handled, there is also little room 
for social norms such as sanctioning to influence private contributions as would be in other 
contexts. Therefore, I argue that my results are primarily driven by the taste of the 
beneficiary explanation where agents yield less utility when out-group agents consume the 
local public goods. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II discusses the conceptual 
framework and relevant literature; Section III presents the NYC311 context and the data; 
Section IV discusses the rest of the data set; Section V outlines the empirical strategies; 
Section VI presents the empirical results; Section VII concludes the paper.  
II. Conceptual Framework 
Although the negative relationship between heterogeneity and public goods 
provision is well known, the underlying mechanisms are not well understood. Habyarimana 
et al. (2007) identify at least three families of mechanisms: preferences, technology, and 
strategy. Within the preferences family, there are two submechanisms. The first 
submechanism posits that the lack of commonality of preferences reduces the level of 
public goods in relatively more heterogeneous communities. Heterogeneity, in this sense, 
implies diversity of taste. In heterogeneous communities, agents prefer different goods and 
services, so they prefer to pull fewer resources together to fund public projects. Alesina, 
Baqir, and Easterly (1999), perhaps the most well-cited study in this area, develops a model 
that captures this behavior and illustrates this mechanism empirically with data on shares 
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of public goods spending from US cities. Unlike the commonality of taste explanation, the 
second submechanism does not put any restriction on agent preferences regarding the 
nature of the public goods, but on agent preferences regarding the beneficiary. Often called 
other-regarding preferences or taste for the beneficiary, this submechanism involves agents 
who attach relatively less utility (or even negative utility) when agents from outside of their 
group consume the public good. As Becker (1957) puts it, this is clearly a “taste for 
discrimination.” In the NYC311 context, if there is any relationship, it is more likely that 
the taste for the beneficiary mechanism is at play since the types of local public goods 
selected for this study are basic necessities for daily urban life.  Contextual examples from 
Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) and Miguel (2001) involve different ethnic groups 
demanding different types of public goods that would benefit themselves more than out-
group members. These include public education spending in areas with high income 
inequality and diverse ages, and religious holidays and language of instruction at school in 
culturally diverse communities. In contrast, most service requests are about everyday 
necessities.  
The second family of mechanisms, technology, concerns the efficacy of collective 
action in a community. Deutsch (1966) and Hardin (1995) argue that homogeneous 
communities may be more successful at public goods provision since it is easier for co-
ethnics, due to their common language and culture (having a better “technology”), to 
communicate among themselves and reach a consensus. In the NYC311 context, I argue 
that this is unlikely to be the underlying mechanism. Although the collective action 
problem remains, there is no difference in the technology of how agents in communities 
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with different levels of heterogeneity decide whether to make service requests or ignore 
the problems. First, for a problem to be resolved, contacting NYC311 does not require 
citizens to coordinate or vote to reach a consensus. Everyone makes a decision voluntarily, 
individually, and privately. Second, there is no obvious set of strategies to contact NYC311 
that is available to in-group members but not to out-group members. NYC311 is available 
to all residents in the New York City metropolitan area regardless of their race, ethnicity, 
or spoken language. There are translators to handle over 180 different languages. Therefore, 
there should be no difference in the level of the efficacy of collective action among 
different census tracts. 
The third family of mechanisms is strategy-based. Strategy-based explanations 
focus on how beliefs influence agents to form a strategy to contribute or free-ride.  For 
example, in a simple game with two choices, contribute or not contribute, if all players 
believe that in-group members will always contribute and out-group members will always 
not, the labeling of which groups the players belong to can influence the selection of 
strategies and outcome of the game. Habyarimana et al. (2007) champions the most 
prominent submechanism in the political science literature: social sanctioning. It involves 
two essential elements: a norm of cooperation within a group, but not across groups, and a 
credible threat of sanctioning if any in-group member shirks. In the NYC311 context, 
however, it is difficult to imagine that there can be any credible threat of sanctioning as 
seen in the Kenyan context of Miguel and Gugerty (2004). This aspect of strategy-based 
mechanisms is absent. The reasoning is similar to why technology-based mechanisms are 
unlikely. Contacting NYC311 is a private act and so the players cannot possibly punish a 
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specific person for not making service requests. Therefore, if there is any negative 
relationship between heterogeneity and private contribution, it likely will stem from the 
taste for the beneficiary mechanism. 
III. The NYC311 Context and Service Requests Data 
The NYC311 system is open all day, every day, and is the largest social services 
information center in the world (Wiseman 2015). It receives more than 3,600 kinds of 
service requests, linking together every department associated with each service so that 
citizens just need to remember one number regardless of whose jurisdiction each incident 
falls under. Since its inception, all non-emergency service requests have to go through 
NYC311, not through the individual departmental systems. Citizens can self-report the type 
and location of the incident or they can also just take a picture and submit it through an 
automated system. The NYC311 system currently handles over 150 languages and 
integrates this user-input information with agency work order management systems to 
address service requests.  
I obtained the incident-level 311 data for NYC from OpenData.gov. While there 
are thousands of types of requests, I focus only on two types of requests: sewer blockage 
and street light outage.1 I select this set of request types to minimize the likelihood that 
their rates of occurrence can be affected by unobserved factors beyond what my 
specifications can capture. Given census tract specific fixed effects or a set of proxy 
                                  
1 Most types of local public goods are financed almost exclusively by revenue from property and other 
taxes at the city level (NYC IBO, 2013). In other words, the costs of restoring the public goods are already 
sunk and thus should not affect the individual decision whether to contact NYC311.  
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variables such as the number of households and population, these types of requests occur 
in a relatively more exogenous fashion than others such as requests about noise or potholes. 
While sewer blockage and street light outage are typically caused by severe weather 
conditions, requests such as potholes occur as a function of both the weather and other 
known, but unobserved, factors such as vehicle-miles driven and vehicle weight per year. 
For robustness checks, I also include an alternative set of requests about power outage and 
heating complaints. 
I then map latitude and longitude (and in some cases street intersections) of every 
single request of the four types from 2005 to 2014 to the census tract it belongs to using 
TIGER/LINE shape files and ArcGIS. Simple geospatial analysis suggests that there is a 
large degree of geographical variation in both the frequency of requests and the level of 
heterogeneity. Figure 1.1 depicts the relationship between the Gini coefficient and the 
frequency of service requests per capita from 2010-2014. Areas that have high level of 
income inequality tend to have low frequency of service requests. In contrast, there seems 
to be no such negative relationship for racial and linguistic heterogeneity (Figures 1.2 and 
1.3). 
 There is some variation in the frequency of monthly service requests by time. Table 
1.1 shows that the per capita frequency of requests declined over the two ACS rounds and 
the differences are statistically significant. It is possible that since the beginning of the 
NYC311 system, problems are less likely to be generated overtime because many of them 
have already been resolved. Another possibility is that citizens make fewer requests 
 12 
 
because they perceive them to have little impact. For both of these, as well as other, 
possibilities, a time trend must be controlled for.  
IV. Data on Heterogeneity and Socioeconomic Characteristics 
I obtain data on heterogeneity and other socioeconomic characteristics from two 
rounds of ACS 5-year estimates (2005-2009 and 2010-2014). For racial and linguistic 
heterogeneity, I use the reverse Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) to construct the 
measures of fractionalization. The HHI is widely used in the literature as a measure of 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) due to the appeal that it can simply be interpreted 
as the probability that any two randomly selected individuals in a particular area belong to 
different racial or ethnic groups (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2010). In other words, it 
captures the likelihood that a person associated with a particular group will encounter 
someone who is an “outsider.” Inverse HHIs are calculated with the following formula: 
1 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼 = 1 − ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖
2
. For racial fractionalization, 𝑠𝑖 is the fraction of each race recorded 
in the ACS. For linguistic fractionalization, 𝑠𝑖 is the fraction of residents who speak one of 
the five types of languages recorded in the ACS. The higher is the HHI, the higher is the 
degree of fractionalization. In the income dimension, I refrain from using the HHI in favor 
of the Gini Coefficient (Gini) because the HHI does not capture the depth of income 
inequality as well as the Gini.2 
                                  
2 While the HHI is an appropriate measure for racial and linguistic heterogeneity, it can be too coarse for 
income inequality. The ACS breaks households into nine income brackets and the top bracket is censored at 
over $150,000. The HHI can severely underestimate the true level of income inequality in census tracts that 
have many top income households or a few households ultra-high earners. Using the HHI to measure 
income inequality may also waste useful information about the distance between households with different 
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According to Table 1.2, these heterogeneity measures, on average, all increase over 
time, confirming prior beliefs that there are both geographical and temporal variations 
among the census tracts. NYC is heterogeneous in all of these dimensions. There is almost 
a 50 percent chance that two randomly selected people will belong to different racial groups 
and will speak different languages at home. The rise in income inequality over this period 
is often attributed to the disproportionate effects of the Great Recession and the recovery 
on different income groups (Saez 2015). Table 1.3 shows the sample mean and standard 
deviation for key control variables in this study over the two sampling periods. The most 
prominent changes over time are that the fraction of white population declined while the 
unemployment rate and the fraction of adults with at least a Bachelor Degree rose 
considerably.  
V. Empirical Strategies 
Estimating the causal impact of heterogeneity on private contributions using 
observational data is challenging due to endogeneity, measurement errors, and reverse 
causality. To address these challenges, I employ three empirical strategies: 1) restricting 
the types of service requests; 2) including census-tract fixed effects and a rich set of time-
varying control variables; and 3) using instrumental variables for income inequality.  
To alleviate concerns about endogeneity, I first carefully select the types of service 
requests. As outlined in Minkoff (2016), the frequency of service requests is driven by two 
                                  
incomes. The distance between each race or each spoken language has little objective meaning, but the 
distance between two monetary values does have interpretable meaning that should be used in the analysis. 
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distinct independent forces: the spatial conditions within a given area and the citizens’ 
propensity to contact NYC311. Without adequately controlling for the former, which 
essentially is a risk set, estimates of the latter would be biased. For example, a densely 
populated census tract may have more occurrences of certain types of incidents such as 
damaged traffic signs just because it has more intersections than less densely populated 
census tracts. Likewise, a bad storm year can lead to a greater number of service requests 
about clogged drainages or short circuited traffic signals in all census tracts regardless of 
the variation in heterogeneity measures. Additionally, problems such as traffic signal 
malfunction, although occurring randomly by nature within a given area, risk being 
reported by travelers, rather than the actual residents whose characteristics I observe from 
the ACS. Therefore, I restrict my analysis to two sets of public goods problems to avoid 
these concerns. The main set of requests for the analysis includes requests about sewer 
blockage, sewer backup, and street light outages. These problems typically occur because 
of severe weather conditions such as heavy rain, melted snow, or a storm. I also construct 
an alternative set of requests that include requests about power outage and heating 
complaints. Compared to the main set of requests, these requests are arguably more private 
in nature, but the act of monitoring and requesting government service still captures the 
essence of the definition of the private contribution of local public goods because these 
problems often affect multiple residential homes and apartments simultaneously.  
To further reduce concerns about omitted variable bias, I employ census-tract 
specific fixed effects. These fixed effects would compare each census tract to itself over 
time and difference out all time-invariant unobserved neighborhood characteristics such as 
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the infrastructure of the streets, the number of intersections, and the structure of pipe 
networks as well as city’s preferential treatment towards certain areas. I also introduce 
flexibility into the model by including the year-month fixed effects to control for aggregate 
shocks, seasonality, and the level of familiarity with the NYC311 that may affect every 
census tract in NYC over time. 
Formally, the fixed effects specification can be expressed as: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝑚𝑦𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡   (1) 
where the dependent variable, 𝑌𝑖𝑡, is the frequency of per capita monthly service requests 
about local public goods in census tract i, in month-year t; 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is a vector of heterogeneity 
measures; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of the covariates described in Table 3 and the fractions of workers 
in every industry; 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖  is the census tract fixed effects; 𝑚𝑦𝑡  is the month-year fixed 
effects; and  𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the random disturbance term.
3 Because unobserved time-varying citizen 
characteristics can cause bias if they codetermine both heterogeneity and the number of 
service requests, I include a rich set of socioeconomic characteristics controls in the vector 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 . Median household income, total population, percent of adult population with a 
Bachelor’s degree of higher, travel time, age composition, racial composition, industry 
composition, spoken language composition, percent of population that is unemployed, 
percent of household married with at least one child, percent of population that did not 
                                  
3 Note that the census tract-level variables from the ACS vary by round but not by month-year as does the 
dependent variable. In summary, the dependent variables vary by month-year for each census tract from 
January 2005 to December 2014, but the explanatory variables for each census tract remain the same from 
January 2005 to December 2009, vary once, and remain the same from January 2010 to December 2014.  
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recently relocate, percent of foreign born population, and percent of owner occupied homes 
are examples of the factors that may determine citizens’ propensity to contact 311 (Minkoff 
2016). Equation (1) is estimated using Ordinary Least Square (OLS).4 
Another potential challenge to the identification is that local governments may treat 
certain census tracts better than others. The heatmap in Figure 1.4 should put aside much 
of any concerns about unequal treatment among census tracts. There is no strong 
correlation among completion time and socioeconomic characteristics of census tracts such 
as income and racial composition. This is not a surprise since the goal of NYC311 was to 
standardize the quality of government services, and census tracts are not political 
boundaries. Still, I include the completion time variable in my set of control variables to 
absorb any other impact it may have on the propensity to use NYC311. For example, if it 
takes a long time to resolve local public goods problems in a particular census tract, 
residents may not use NYC311 as much just because they feel that the system is ineffective, 
not because of the level of heterogeneity changes in their census tract.  
Although the fixed effects model can help address many concerns about 
endogeneity, it does not address the issues of measurement errors and reverse causality. 
Both issues are likely to be important given the nature of survey data and the context of 
local public goods. More importantly, income inequality, unlike racial and linguistic 
                                  
4 I choose to estimate all of my specifications using OLS with fixed effects rather than with count models 
for the following reason. First, count models suffer from incidental parameter bias.  Second, the negative 
binomial with fixed effects estimates are not true fixed effects estimates (Hausman et al. 1984). As 
discussed earlier, having a reliable empirical strategy such as the fixed effects model is crucial for drawing 
valid statistical inferences in this paper. To address the excessive zero problem with count data, I follow 
Burbidge (1988) and use the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformation (IHS) to transform the monthly 
frequency of service requests. With IHS, unlike taking the logarithm, zeros are defined. 
 17 
 
fractionalization, is hardly exogenous. If the Tiebout hypothesis is correct, an increase in 
income inequality may just be the result of households sorting across neighborhoods for an 
optimal bundle of local public goods according to their tastes. Specifications that do not 
address this possibility can suffer from reverse causality.  
Fortunately, the empirical literature suggests that sorting between neighborhoods 
in US cities has remained fairly constant or even declined in recent years (Cutler, Glaeser, 
and Vigdor 1999 and Kremer 1997). In the context of this paper, the bias from Tiebout 
sorting is also likely to be less of a concern due to three reasons. First, the local public 
goods studied in this paper are standard basic public amenities that are maintained at the 
city level. In contrast to public education that is provided with a much larger degree of 
variation in quality, it is unlikely that these local public goods alone can drive relocation 
trends. Second, a measure of mobility is already controlled for in my set of control variables. 
It also varies little over time, confirming the findings from the neighborhood sorting 
literature.5 Third, the quality of government responses to these requests is likely to be 
similar across census tracts since my analysis of completion time for service requests 
reveals no preferential treatment among census tracts.  
While recent empirical findings and the context of this paper provide some 
reassurance, they cannot fully rule out the Tiebout hypothesis. Most specifically, the 
possibility that citizens may relocate to consume other local public goods that are correlated 
                                  
5 Even with little mobility between the two rounds of ACS, the variation in heterogeneity can still come 
from other ways. Income inequality can change over time because household income may grow at different 
rates. In the racial and linguistic dimensions, the level of heterogeneity can vary as population grows or 
shrinks. 
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with the unobserved quality of the local public goods studied in this paper cannot be 
completely ruled out. For this reason and to correct for attenuation bias, I instrument the 
Gini coefficient for the distribution of income observed in 2005-2009 and 2010-2014 with 
a group of instruments from the 2000 Decennial Census.  
The first instrument is the fraction of households earning more than $200,000 in 
2000. Studies of national income growth trend in the US suggest that income at the top of 
the income distribution grew disproportionately faster than did income for the rest of the 
society (Saez 2015). I expect census tracts with a larger share of top income households to 
get more exposure to this trend and thus experience a higher level of income inequality 
over time. The second instrument is the fraction of workers in the information technology 
industry in 2000. I exploit one of the most common explanations for income inequality in 
the post-war era: skill-biased technological change (SBTC). The shift in demand for high-
skill labor and the rapid growth in information technology during this period favored 
workers in this industry (David et al. 2006; Heathcote et al. 2010). Riding the wave of 
technological advancements, census tracts with a large fraction of workers in the 
information industry in the past should experience more income inequality over time. 
Unlike the first two instruments, the third instrument rests on the flip side of this intuition. 
I expect census tracts with a larger share of workers in the public sector to experience a 
decline in income inequality over time since the within-tract workforce composition should 
get a relatively little exposure to both the national income growth trend and the SBTC. The 
income distribution in census tracts with a larger share of public sector employees should 
also be more immune to the impact of the Great Recession and its uneven recovery that 
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spurred the rise in income inequality in recent years (Kopelman and Rosen 2016; Saez 
2015).  
The identifying assumption is that these instruments do not affect the frequency of 
service requests per capita except through the Gini coefficient, given other control variables 
in my model. Since all of the instruments are from 2000, I mechanically preclude the 
possibility of reverse causality. Controlling for multiple socio-demographic variables such 
as current income, month-year fixed effects, and the fractions of workers in every industry 
that the ACS collects, I argue that the instruments do not affect other unobserved 
determinants of service requests that may still remain in the error term. In the results section, 
the Sargan-Hansen overidentification test will provide another screening test whether the 
excluded instruments are appropriately independent of the error process.  
Figure 1.5 shows the relationships between the instruments and the frequency of 
service requests per capita. The fraction of top income households and the fraction of 
workers in the information industry in 2000 are negatively correlated with service requests, 
while the fraction of workers in the public sector in 2000 is positively correlated with 
service requests. These relationships are not surprising given the ways I expect the 
instruments to affect the current level of income inequality. To visualize the strength of 
each instrument, I plot them against the Gini coefficient observed in the two rounds of ACS 
in Figure 1.6. As expected, the fraction of top income households and the fraction of 
workers in the information industry in 2000 are positively correlated with the Gini, while 
the fraction of workers in the public sector in 2000 is negatively correlated with the Gini. 
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 The 2SLS equations are given below: 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 = 𝑍𝑖2000
′ 𝜃 + 𝐻𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝑚𝑦𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡    (2) 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡̂ + 𝐻𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝑚𝑦𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡   (3) 
where the dependent variable in the first-stage regression, 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡, is the Gini coefficient in 
census tract i, in month-year t; 𝑍𝑖2000 is a vector of the instruments taken from the 2000 
Decennial Census; 𝐻𝑖𝑡 is a vector of racial and linguistic heterogeneity measures; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the 
vector of covariates described in Table 3; 𝑚𝑦𝑡 is the month-year fixed effects;  𝜂 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜇 is 
the random disturbance terms; and  𝐺𝑖𝑛?̂? is the predicted Gini coefficient from the first-
stage.  
VI. Results and Discussion 
The theoretical discussions in Section II suggest that the relationship between 
heterogeneity and private contributions in the NYC311 context might be a negative one. 
Across multiple specifications, I find robust empirical evidence that it is income inequality 
that lowers private contributions, not racial or linguistic heterogeneity. Total population 
and median income are both negatively associated with private contributions in most 
specifications.   
 Table 1.4 presents the results from estimating variants of equation (5). In a basic 
OLS specification with no controls or fixed effects, the racial fractionalization index, along 
with the Gini coefficient, have statistically significant negative coefficients. However, once 
the month-year fixed effects and controls are included in column 2, the coefficient on the 
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racial fractionalization index becomes much smaller and is no longer statistically different 
from zero. The magnitude of the coefficient of the Gini coefficient also drops by half, 
suggesting that both the time shocks and omitted variable bias may be at play, but it remains 
highly statistically significant. Column 3 introduces the census-tract specific fixed effects 
with no controls, and the magnitude of the effect of income inequality drops further towards 
zero, though it is still statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Adding control variables 
in column 4 does not significantly change this magnitude. The drop in the magnitude of 
the Gini coefficient from close to -1 in column 2 to around -0.45 in columns 3 and 4 could 
be from either controlling for time-invariant unobserved characteristics or from a worsened 
attenuation bias. Since fixed effects models tend to exacerbate attenuation bias, actual 
impacts may be substantially larger in magnitude. With all the fixed effects and control 
variables included, a 0.01 point increase in the Gini coefficient is associated with roughly 
a 0.5 percent reduction in private contributions. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest 
that going from the level of income inequality in Manhattan, where income inequality is 
the highest, to that of Queens would lead to a roughly 10 percent increase in private 
contributions.  
Across multiple specifications, the negative effect of total population is not 
surprising. Residents can free-ride others to make service requests for them. A one percent 
increase in the population is associated with a decline in private contributions from 0.4 to 
0.7 percent.  This can be interpreted as a real-world evidence of the bystander effect first 
coined by Latane and Darley (1968). A more surprising finding is that median income is 
negatively associated with private contributions even though the level of need for service 
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should be as good as random across census tracts. This contradicts the findings from 
Feigenbaum and Hall (2015), who find that high income neighborhoods are more likely to 
use NYC311. The presence of this income effect may imply that residents in higher income 
areas tend to also have higher opportunity costs. 
In Table 1.5, results from 2SLS specifications are presented. All specifications 
include the month-year fixed effects and controls. In columns 1 and 2, I separately 
instrument the Gini coefficient with the fraction of top income households and the fraction 
of workers in the public sector in 2000, respectively.6 For both specifications, the first-
stage F-statistics suggest that the instruments are strongly correlated with the Gini 
coefficient. The strength of the fraction of top income households as an instrumental 
variable is especially notable since the first-stage F-statistics is over an order of magnitude 
larger than the conventional value of 10 for a “strong” instrument. The estimates of the 
impact of income inequality rose considerably from OLS estimates, to -2.3 and -4.9 in 
columns 1 and 2, respectively. In columns 3 through 5, I use both instruments at once to 
potentially get more asymptotic efficiency. The model in column 3 is run over the entire 
sample while the models in columns 4 and 5 are run separately for each round of the ACS. 
The Sargan-Hansen test results all indicate that the null hypothesis that the instrumental 
variables are not correlated with the error term in these models cannot be rejected. The 
estimates in column 3 are my preferred estimates due to a large first-stage F-statistics and 
the sample size. With 2SLS, a 0.01 point increase in the Gini coefficient—a change 
                                  
6 The fraction of workers in the information industry does not pass the conventional F-statistics test. 
Therefore, I exclude it in this specification. However, it will be used in a robustness check specification 
with an alternative set of requests as the dependent variable. 
 23 
 
comparable to the actual increase of the average Gini coefficient between the two rounds 
of ACS in NYC— leads to roughly a 2.5 percent reduction in private contributions.  
As an additional robustness check, I run both the fixed effects model and the 2SLS 
model with an alternative set of service requests which include requests about electrical 
outage and heating complaints. In Table 1.6, the estimate of the effect of the Gini 
coefficient is not statistically different from zero in the fixed effects model, but the 2SLS 
estimates are comparable to my preferred 2SLS estimates in Table 5 once I instrument the 
Gini coefficient with the fraction of top income households and the fraction of workers in 
the information industry in 2000. Generally, the magnitude of the 2SLS estimates with an 
alternative set of service requests is slightly smaller.  
My findings run counter to the classic theoretical prediction that the private 
provision of public goods is independent of income redistribution (Bergstrom, Blume, and 
Varian 1986; Warr 1983). The reason is that the public goods studied in this paper are not 
pure public goods. They are locally consumed, require very little effort to contribute, and 
can be congested.7 My results are more in line with the recent findings from studies such 
as Anderson et al. (2008) and Tavoni et al. (2011). In these studies, income is exogenously 
varied among players in a laboratory seting and the authors find that income inequality 
reduces the private provision of public goods because it erodes social capital. While the 
contexts of these studies differ greatly, they both point to a reduction in social capital as a 
common underlying mechanism. The negative relationship between income inequality and 
                                  
7 Allouch (2015) provides a formal proof that many neutrality results in the classic theoretical works on the 
private provision of public goods do not hold when public goods are no longer pure. 
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social capital is also found in a large scale observational study by Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2000) where social capital is proxied for by the various membership participation rates at 
the metropolitan level. In Canada, Payne and Smith (2015) finds that income inequality 
reduces charitable giving, which is also a form of privately provided public goods. 
Since the local public goods in this paper do not have redistributive properties and 
cost very little effort, my results—taken together with the insights from these studies—
suggest that income inequality likely reduces private contributions through its effects on 
the utility individuals attach to the welfare of their neighbors. Given the consistency of my 
estimates, reducing the level of income inequality can be an effective policy option to 
encourage more private contributions along with the many improvements in social 
outcomes that have already been extensively studied such as social cohesion and public 
health (Pickett and Wilkinson 2015). More importantly, the results in this paper suggest 
that previous findings on the societal costs of racial and linguistic heterogeneity do not 
necessarily generalize to other settings. 
VII. Conclusions 
This paper estimates the effects of heterogeneity on private contributions to local 
public goods. It takes a series of steps to provide rigorous empirical evidence on the 
relationship between heterogeneity and private contributions. Combining the NYC311 data 
with two rounds of the ACS, I employ census-tract fixed effects models and cross-sectional 
2SLS with three instrumental variables. I find evidence across multiple specifications that 
it is income inequality, not racial or linguistic heterogeneity, that lowers private 
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contributions to local public goods. As communities become more heterogeneous in the 
income dimension, individuals contribute less, on a per capita basis, to local public goods. 
In my preferred 2SLS specification, a one standard deviation increase in the Gini 
coefficient reduces private contributions by about 33 percent. Back-of-the-envelope 
calculations suggest that raising the level of income inequality in Queens to the level in 
Manhattan (a change of about 1.5 standard deviation) would bring about a 49 percent 
reduction in private contributions. Because of the specific nature of how service requests 
are made through NYC311, the underlying mechanism is likely the taste for the beneficiary 
mechanism in which individuals care less about their neighbors’ welfare. 
There are two important caveats to keep in mind when interpreting and 
extrapolating these results. First, due to the many steps taken to improve the statistical 
inference in this paper, the interpretations are quite specific to the NYC311 context and the 
types of public goods chosen for this paper. Had different types of public goods been 
chosen, or the mechanics of how residents make contributions were different, the 
underlying mechanism and the overall effect on private contributions may have been 
different. Second, the fact that some of my results vary when I use an alternative set of the 
types of requests suggests that more research is needed to understand how and why the 
specific nature of each type of public goods can give rise to these differences. Excludability 
of these local public goods is likely an important determinant of these differences. Finally, 
pairing service requests data with subjective wellbeing data or home prices data may well 
allow researchers to estimate willingness to pay measures for many types of public goods 
beyond those for which the demand has already been well documented. 
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Chapter 2 
School and Teacher Preferences: Evidence from a Multi-stage Internal Labor 
Market  
(with Elton Mykerezi and Aaron Sojourner) 
I. Introduction 
Is a completely free teacher labor market really a good idea? As more US school 
districts begin to give schools more hiring autonomy and reduce the importance of seniority, 
the distribution of teacher quality remains a major concern among policymakers. High-
performing, high-experience teachers tend to be concentrated in high-achievement schools 
mostly serving students from relatively advantaged backgrounds (Isenberg et al. 2013).  
From the perspective of equity, this situation is troubling since quality teachers are not 
where they are needed the most. Previous studies have pointed to teacher mobility as one 
of the primary causes of this phenomenon. Because salaries are mostly flat within a school 
district, schools with less desirable nonmonetary characteristics tend to have a difficult 
time competing for, and retaining, high quality teachers. Moreover, transfer rules that favor 
seniority can reinforce this trend, allowing schools that are generally perceived to be more 
desirable to recruit even more experienced teachers from other schools. Although some 
studies have used work history data to identify these transfer patterns in many school 
districts, observing only the final matched outcomes between teachers and schools do not 
allow for understanding why, and at what point in the hiring process, these patterns emerge. 
More importantly, data limitations often prevent researchers from identifying the extent to 
which preferences and other labor market rules contribute to these patterns. Without a good 
understanding of how these factors shape the final matched outcomes, it is difficult to 
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design any policy to address concerns about disadvantaged students’ access to quality 
teachers. 
Data on the entire job transfer process allows one to gain more insights into the 
inner workings of the teacher labor market. This paper analyzes the two-sided multi-stage 
matching process between teachers and schools in the Minneapolis Public Schools (MPS) 
that occurs on a web-based internal teacher transfer platform where every action from every 
market participant is recorded. On the teacher side, these actions include which teachers 
apply to which postings from which schools and which job offers they accept or decline. 
On the school side, we observe how they select candidates for interviews at the resumé-
screening stage and how they rank candidates at the end of the interview stage. Linking 
these actions with teacher and school characteristics information recorded in the 
administrative data set allows us to separately recover teacher and school preferences.  
Our contribution is three-fold. First, we add much-needed evidence to a handful of 
studies that can separately identify teacher and school preferences (Boyd el al. 2011, 2013). 
Across multiple specifications of our discrete choice models, we find that an average 
teacher prefers schools with high proportions of white students and teachers, high reading 
achievement, high average teacher experience, high enrollment, and low pupil-teacher 
ratios. All else equal, teachers prefer less commute time. We also find evidence of 
heterogeneity in teacher preferences. Although on average teachers do not find schools 
with high proportions of students of color desirable, teachers of color prefer them more 
than white teachers do. Highly-effective teachers, on the other hand, dislike schools serving 
high proportions of students of color than less-effective teachers. For school preferences, 
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we find that being white, female, young, more effective, and holding an advanced degree 
increases the likelihood of being hired. Schools across the spectrum of student advantage hire 
applicants who are substantially more effective than their average applicant, despite the fact that 
they do not systematically know applicants’ effectiveness ratings.8 This is evidence that all schools 
can recognize and do value effectiveness among applicants. 
Second, this paper is the first to estimate the changes of hard-to-staff school 
characteristics required to attract more highly effective applicants in a revealed preference 
framework. Using the estimated teacher preferences, we compute the marginal rates of 
substitution among school characteristics and the changes in the school characteristics 
required to create indifference between working at any type of schools and for any type of 
teachers. To demonstrate a possible policy change, we estimate that the district must 
increase the pay at bottom-quintile schools by roughly $1,500 a year to create indifference 
for highly effective teachers to transfer from top-quintile schools. This increase in pay 
scales up considerably as commute time increases. 
Finally, our paper takes advantage of the multi-stage nature of the job transfer 
process at MPS and finds evidence that school preferences before and after the interview 
stage are different. At the resumé-screening stage, schools highly prefer candidates whose 
resumés indicate that they are young, white, holding an advanced degree, experienced, 
effective, and have no history of school-hopping. As schools obtain more information in 
the interview stage, the importance of advanced degree, experience, and history of school-
                                  
8 Our interviews with five school principals confirm that schools do not know applicants’ effectiveness. In 
addition, in all years of I&S not one applicant shared her effectiveness ratings at any time with these 
principals.    
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hopping diminishes while age, being female, being an early contract hire, and effectiveness 
show greater importance.  
  This chapter is organized as follows. Section II provides the background and 
context of the educational landscape in MPS and its online job transfer platform. Section 
III gives an overview of the findings in the related literature. Section IV lays out the 
conceptual framework that provides a foundation for the empirical strategies, which are 
discussed in detail in Section V. Section VI presents the results, after which Section VII 
concludes. 
 
II. Background and Context 
Interview & Select (I&S) is a web-based internal teacher transfer platform for MPS 
system, a school district that covers all of the city of Minneapolis, Minnesota. The total 
enrollment in MPS is around 35,000 students in primary and secondary schools. It is among 
the most diverse school districts in the US with students speaking over 90 different 
languages at home. Like in many other US school districts, schools serving high fractions 
of students of color tend to have low student achievement and they employ teachers who 
are less experienced and less effective (Figure 2.1).9  
At MPS, vacancies are filled internally first. After the internal job transfer process 
is over, the district then places external applicants to any remaining position not taken by 
                                  
9 Throughout this paper, we use the growth in the percentage of students who are proficient in reading that 
partials out any prior student achievement as measure of achievement in a given school year. 
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its existing teachers. As such, teacher and school preferences in the internal labor market 
are more likely to have an effect on the distribution of teachers. Instead of giving the most 
senior teacher a guaranteed placement at her desired school as in the past, I&S was created 
in 2009 to give both principals and teachers a larger role in determining internal 
assignments. There are a total of five stages to I&S (Diagram 1). At the beginning of each 
round of I&S, schools post vacancies on the I&S platform where every teacher in MPS can 
see and apply online if they would like to transfer. Each teacher applying for any transfer 
uploads a single resumé, with a suggested standardized format, that goes to all schools 
applied to by that teacher in that round. Once the posting round is closed, for each posting 
the system automatically sends interview invitations to the top five most senior applicants. 
If the posting garners more than five applicants, the principal, often supported by a school-
based hiring committee, then has the option to send interview invitations to up to five other 
applicants, regardless of their seniority. 10  Seniority is measured by the first date of 
employment with MPS. Before submitting the application, applicants know how senior 
they are, but do not know how their seniority is relative to other applicants. After all the 
interviews are conducted, schools rank up to four applicants for whom they are willing to 
offer the position.11 At an established date and time, email offers simultaneously go to the 
first-ranked applicant for each position. These applicants have 48 hours to accept one of 
                                  
10 Beginning in 2014, the automatic interview cutoff dropped to four most senior applicants and the 
maximum number of interviews declined to eight. In other words, schools can select up to four candidates 
(not five) regardless of their seniority if the posting garners more than four applicants. 
11 If a posting garners fewer than four applicants, the school has the option to not offer the position to 
anyone. From 2009 to 2013, if a posting garnered four or more applicants, schools were required to offer 
the position to an applicant even if they would prefer to make no offers and perhaps re-open the posting in 
later rounds. From 2014 onwards, schools are no longer required to make the offer even if they garner four 
or more applicants. 
 31 
 
any offers made. For any positions where the first-ranked applicant declines or does not 
respond within 48 hours, a new set of email offers automatically goes to the second-ranked 
applicant. If offers are still not accepted, this process repeats a third and fourth time within 
round. An applicant who accepts an offer in an early set can forfeit it to accept an offer that 
arrives in a later set. If no ranked applicant has accepted an offer at the end of the fourth 
set of offers, the posting remains open and the school can repost the position again in a 
second round. Two rounds of the I&S process are conducted each year, each with 
applications, interviews and up to four offers.12 Only after the I&S process can schools 
look for external applicants. 
Given these transfer rules, the internal teacher labor market in this context is neither 
entirely deterministic nor completely decentralized. On the one hand, I&S still exhibits 
characteristics of a job-queuing process commonly observed in most American school 
districts. The more senior the applicant is relative to her competitors, the more probable 
she will successfully transfer just because she is more likely to automatically qualify for 
an interview. If the cost of search for teachers is not negligible, or if the cost of receiving 
a rejection is high, teachers may choose to wait and queue up for a more desirable job. On 
the other hand, the process gives MPS principals a high level of hiring autonomy and offers 
less senior teachers a chance to transfer. Starting in 2009, principals and their hiring 
committees can now interview and hire any applicant they desire. As such, both teacher 
                                  
12 For a more detailed description on the transfer rules of I&S over time, see Table A.1. Table A.2 tests the 
integrity of the rules. 
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and school preferences likely will both play a role in shaping the distribution of teachers in 
the MPS context. 
III. Literature Review 
Research on teacher mobility and the teacher labor market in the US has found that 
urban schools typically serve high concentrations of low-income, low-achieving, and 
students of color, and these schools tend to have lower teacher quality and a higher teacher 
turnover rate. Studies have found that teachers in urban schools tend to be less experienced 
(Clotfelter et al. 2005; Clotfelter et al. 2006; Rockoff 2004), and assigned to teach subjects 
that do not match their qualifications (Ingersoll 2003). In one of the largest studies of the 
distribution of teachers, Lankford et al. (2002) examines the variation in the average 
attributes of all public school teachers in the New York State from 1985-2000 and finds 
that urban schools not only have teachers with lower pre-service qualifications as measured 
by standardized test scores but also have a higher teacher turnover rate compared to 
suburban schools.  
Teacher mobility may be one reason for this sorting pattern. Compared to teachers 
who remain, teachers who move often have better pre-service qualifications and tend to 
move away from hard-to-staff schools (Boyd et al. 2005; Goldhaber, Gross, and Player 
2007). More importantly, teachers who leave also generally move to schools with lower 
concentrations of minority and disadvantaged students, and a higher level of student 
achievement  (Boyd et al. 2005; Hanushek, Kain, Rivkin 2004; Hanushek, Rivkin 2007; 
Scafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner 2007). The distribution of principal quality and 
principal sorting behavior follow a similar pattern. A large number of studies have 
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documented that schools serving disadvantaged students are more likely to have high rate 
of principal turnover and smaller principal applicant pools (Branch, Hanushek, & Rivkin, 
2009; Gates, Ringel, Santibanez, Ross, and Chung, 2003). Loeb, Kalagrides, and Horng 
(2010) find that in Miami-Dade county schools serving disadvantaged students tend to have 
principals who have less work experience, less education, and graduated from less selective 
colleges and universities. Additionally, a series of follow-up surveys confirm that 
principals and assistant principals prefer to work in easier-to-serve schools with favorable 
working conditions.  
In contexts where school leaders have some level of hiring autonomy, school 
preferences for teachers are equally likely to be influential in creating these transfer 
patterns. Qualitative studies suggest that the most sought after teacher attributes are 
communication skills, strong academic background, enthusiasm, interpersonal skills, 
flexibility, and ability to work in a team (Johnson and Roellke 1999). Béteille, Kalogrides, 
and Loeb (2012) examine schools in Miami-Dade County and find that high-achievement 
schools are able to attract and hire more effective teachers, assign new teachers to students 
in a more equitable fashion, and retain higher quality teachers more successfully than other 
schools. DeArmond, Gross, and Goldhaber (2010), however, argue that much of the 
difference in hiring outcomes among schools may come from schools’ “local contexts,” 
not from its approach to staffing. Recruiters in hard-to-staff schools are no more aggressive 
in their hiring style than recruiters in easier-to-serve schools. It was the local contexts such 
as school attractiveness that drove the different hiring outcomes. 
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Addressing the challenges concerning the distribution of teacher quality is difficult 
if one cannot separately identify how much a job transfer is due to teacher preferences or 
to school preferences. Due to data limitations, only a handful of studies can empirically 
disentangle teacher and school preferences. Boyd et al. (2011) uses applications-to-transfer 
data and work history data in New York City to disentangle the role of teacher preferences 
from the role of school preferences in explaining observed differences in transfer patterns. 
They find that teachers with stronger pre-service qualifications are more likely to request 
transfers. On the other hand, teachers with higher post-hire measures of quality and more 
experience are less likely to request transfers. For school preferences, they find that all 
schools exhibit preference for all types of quality measures. Boyd et al. (2013) combines 
the use of a game theoretic, two-sided matching model with method of simulated moments 
(MSM) estimation to study factors affecting the match of elementary teachers to their first 
jobs. They find that schools in some New York districts prefer teachers who have strong 
academic achievement and live close by and teachers prefer schools that are close 
geographically, suburban, and serving relatively advantaged students. Compared to non-
white teachers, white teachers tend to prefer schools serving small proportions of minority 
students, a result we also document in our context. 
Two recent works add both theoretical depth and new insights to the inner workings 
of the teacher labor market. Ahn (2015) analyzes North Carolina public school data and a 
survey of teachers’ career plans and finds that teachers vary in their willingness to transfer 
and choose different search strategies at different stages of their careers. Mid-career 
teachers with high pre-service qualifications are the most eager to transfer while high-
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experience teachers are the least likely to transfer. Additionally, the author finds that new 
teachers typically start at a low-performing school before moving up to better schools as 
they gain experience. Teachers from low-performing schools search for high-performing 
schools about 90 percent of the time. Likewise, low-performing schools still search for 
high-experience teachers about 80 percent of the time even if they face the risk of being 
turned down. However, high-performing schools focus their search only on high-
experience teachers. In the Florida setting, Feng and Sass (2016) find that where teachers 
are in the distribution of effectiveness can influence their transfer rate. Particularly, 
teachers at the top and the bottom of this distribution move at a higher rate than teachers 
with average effectiveness. In addition, there is evidence of assortative matching where 
more productive teachers are more likely to stay if their peers are productive.  
Teacher preferences are not the only force driving these transfer patterns. 
Bonhomme et al. (2015) use administrative data containing every contract between 
teachers and a primary school in the Netherlands to show that job characteristics can affect 
teacher turnover not only through teacher preferences but also through their effect on 
access to other job opportunities. In other words, a teacher may remain in her job not only 
because she gets utility from doing so, but also because the current job attributes reduce 
her access to more attractive job opportunities. For example, teachers working in low-
achieving schools may find it difficult to transfer to high-achieving schools or private 
schools. Any econometric model aimed at analyzing job transfers would need to account 
for the job characteristics of the origin-workplace as well. The authors find that teachers 
prefer schools with a smaller pupil-teacher ratio, higher average age of teachers, lower 
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support-to-teaching staff ratio, lower proportion of disadvantaged and minority students, 
and more teaching hours (due to a salary schedule that varies with teaching hours). For the 
effect of the current job on other potential offers, they find that working in a school with a 
large proportion of disadvantaged and minority students increases access to an alternative 
school with similar student body attributes but lowers utility by decreasing access to 
schools with lower proportions of disadvantaged and minority students. 
IV. Conceptual Framework 
In this section, we present a conceptual framework of teacher and school 
preferences. A teacher would enter I&S only if she believes that a transfer to a new job will 
raise her utility. Likewise, a school would allocate its limited interview slots or make an 
offer only to a select group of applicants that will raise its utility. Since salaries are flat 
across schools, schools compete with nonmonetary characteristics such as school quality, 
location, and teacher and student demographics.13 Similarly, teachers compete with their 
characteristics and potentially the characteristics of the schools they are currently teaching 
at. School and teacher attributes are not always completely revealed. For example, schools 
may be able to gauge the information on teacher ethnicity, effectiveness, and age at the 
resumé-screening stage but this information is likely to be more accurate when it is later 
revealed at the interview stage. 
                                  
13 There are, however, some cases where monetary incentives may be at play. From 2006 to 2010, some 
MPS schools adopted pay-for-performance regimes as part of Q Comp, a state law that was enacted in 
2005. We exploit this school-level variation in the next section. 
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We start by modeling teacher preferences for schools. For simplicity, we omit time 
but we will add it back in the next section. In this internal labor market, there are N active 
teachers and M job postings. Within each posting, there can be up to A applicants, where 
𝐴 ≤ 𝑁. The utility function of teacher i currently teaching at sending-school j is given by 
𝑢𝑖𝑗(𝑋𝑗, 𝑇𝑖, 𝜖𝑖𝑗) , where 𝑋𝑗 is a vector of the characteristics of school j , 𝑇𝑖 is a vector of 
teacher i’s characteristics, and 𝜖𝑖𝑗  is an idiosyncratic difference among teachers’ 
preferences. Assume that 𝜖 is i.i.d extreme value. Given this utility function and assuming 
that separability assumption holds, teacher i will apply to a potential receiving-school k 
from her sending-school j only if:  
𝑢𝑖𝑘(𝑋𝑘, 𝑇𝑖, 𝜖𝑖𝑘) > 𝑢𝑖𝑗(𝑋𝑗, 𝑇𝑖 , 𝜖𝑖𝑗) 
𝑓(𝑋𝑘, 𝑇𝑖) + 𝜖𝑖𝑘 > 𝑓(𝑋𝑗, 𝑇𝑖) + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 
𝜖𝑖𝑘 >  𝑓(𝑋𝑗, 𝑇𝑖) − 𝑓(𝑋𝑘, 𝑇𝑖) + 𝜖𝑖𝑗. 
If 𝜖𝑖𝑘 follows a logistic distribution, we can write the probability that teacher i applies to 
school k from school j as: 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 1) =
𝑒
𝑓(𝑋𝑗,𝑇𝑖)−𝑓(𝑋𝑘,𝑇𝑖)+𝜖𝑖𝑗
1+𝑒
𝑓(𝑋𝑗𝑇𝑖)−𝑓(𝑋𝑘,𝑇𝑖)+𝜖𝑖𝑗
     (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘 is a binary variable that takes value 1 if teacher i applies from school j to school 
k and 0 if otherwise.  
This model incorporates not only the information about the attributes at the 
potential receiving-school (𝑋𝑘) but also about teachers own characteristics (𝑇𝑖) and the 
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attributes of the sending-school (𝑋𝑗). Note that the model allows the econometrician to 
include every active teacher in MPS at any given time the I&S was operating, not just those 
who participated in I&S. We include each teacher’s own characteristics because there are 
reasons to believe that the interactions between teacher characteristics (that do not vary 
within teacher) and school characteristics (that vary by school) may produce differential 
effects on the utility received. For example, white teachers might receive more utility from 
working at a school serving high proportions of white students, a result documented in 
Boyd et al. (2013).  
On the demand side, there are several ways to model school preferences due to the 
multi-stage nature of I&S. In the simplest case, we first consider the decision whether to 
move a candidate forward to the interview stage based on how her résumé compares to the 
minimum requirement to perform the job she applies to. Assume that the pool of candidates 
that receiving-school k can review for position s has A candidates. Let 𝑣𝑖𝑘(𝑋𝑗, 𝑇𝑖, 𝜀𝑖𝑘) be 
the utility that receiving-school k gains from employing teacher i from sending-school j, 
where 𝑋𝑗 is a vector of school-level characteristics of school j, 𝑇𝑖 is a vector of teacher i’s 
characteristics, and 𝜀𝑖𝑘  is an idiosyncratic difference among schools in their ability to 
assess the utility received from employing teacher i. Assuming that the separability 
assumption holds, school k will interview teacher i from school j only if: 
𝑣𝑖𝑘(𝑋𝑗, 𝑇𝑖, 𝜀𝑖𝑘) > 𝑅𝑘𝑠 
𝑔(𝑋𝑗, 𝑇𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑘 > 𝑅𝑘𝑠 
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𝜀𝑖𝑘 >  𝑅𝑘𝑠 − 𝑔(𝑋𝑗, 𝑇𝑖) 
where 𝑅𝑘𝑠 is school k’s reservation value of hiring a teacher for position s. In other words, 
school k will not offer an interview to teacher i if the utility it expects to gain from hiring 
her is less than 𝑅𝑘𝑠, which will be estimated as school-position specific fixed effects. If 𝜀𝑖𝑘 
follows a logistic distribution, we can write the probability that school k selects teacher i 
as: 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 1) =
𝑒
𝑅𝑘𝑠−𝑔(𝑋𝑗,𝑇𝑖)
1+𝑒
𝑅𝑘𝑠−𝑔(𝑋𝑗,𝑇𝑖)
      (2) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘 takes the value of 1 if school k decides to move teacher i from school j forward 
in the hiring process and takes value 0 if otherwise. We include sending-school 
characteristics because they may contain additional information that teacher characteristics 
do not. Essentially, we can test whether sending-school characteristics have any impact on 
the odds of being selected as done in Bonhomme et al. (2016). The sample includes every 
applicant for position s.14  
 As the hiring process passes through the interview stage, schools rank the 
candidates and decide who merit an offer. Model (2) will no longer be an accurate 
representation of this decision-making process. Instead, we can model how schools rank 
candidates by assuming that schools rank candidates by comparing them in a pairwise 
                                  
14 We are aware that some applicants are guaranteed to receive interview invitations based on their 
seniority. So in our estimation, we include an indicator of whether an applicant automatically qualifies by 
the seniority rule.   
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manner. When comparing teacher i from school j and teacher z from school w, receiving-
school k will rank teacher i above teacher z only if: 
𝑣𝑖𝑘(𝑋𝑗, 𝑇𝑖, 𝜀𝑖𝑘) > 𝑣𝑧𝑘(𝑋𝑤, 𝑇𝑧 , 𝜀𝑧𝑘) 
where 𝑋𝑤  is a vector of the characteristics of school w, 𝑇𝑧  is a vector of teacher z 
characteristics, and 𝜀𝑧𝑘  is an idiosyncratic difference among schools in their ability to 
assess the utility received from employing teacher z. Let 𝑦𝑎𝑘 = 1 denote that school k most 
prefers candidate a out of all A potential candidates. In this case, it must be that:  
𝑣𝑎𝑘 ≥ max {𝑣1𝑘, … , 𝑣𝐴𝑘}. 
On the other hand, if 𝑦𝑎𝑘 = 3, this means that school k  third-most prefers candidate a. 
 One way of using the information about which candidate schools rank first (prefer 
the most) out of A candidates in the interview pool is to model this decision as a 
multinomial logit model (McFadden 1973, 1974):  
𝑃(𝑦𝑎𝑘 = 1) = 𝑃(𝑣𝑎𝑘 ≥ max{𝑣1𝑘, … , 𝑣𝐴𝑘}) 
=
exp(𝑣𝑎𝑘)
∑ exp(𝑣𝑞𝑘)
𝐴
𝑞=1
                     (3) 
where 𝑃(𝑦𝑎𝑘 = 1) is the probability that teacher a ranks first by school k.  
 Alternatively, we can extract more information from school k’s hiring decision by 
utilizing the post-interview ranking of candidates. For convenience, let 𝑟𝑙𝑘 be the candidate 
number that receives rank l by school k. The relation between 𝑟 and 𝑦 is given by: 
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𝑦𝑎𝑘 = 𝑙 ↔ 𝑟𝑙𝑘 = 𝑎,                 for all 𝑎, 𝑙 = 1, … , 𝐴. 
Therefore, 𝑟3𝑘 = 4 means that school k ranks candidate number 4 third from the top. 
Likewise, 𝑟𝐴𝑘 = 1 means that school k ranks candidate number 1 last. Using this notation, 
we obtain the rank-ordered logit model as specified in Beggs et al. (1981) and Chapman 
and Staelin (1982): 
𝑃(𝑟𝑘) = 𝑃(𝑣𝑘𝑟1𝑘 > 𝑣𝑘𝑟2𝑘 > ⋯ > 𝑣𝑘𝑟𝐴𝑘) 
= ∏
exp(𝑣𝑘𝑟𝑎𝑘)
∑ exp (𝑣𝑘𝑟𝑞𝑘)
𝐴
𝑞=𝑎
𝐴−1
𝑎=1
                   (4) 
where 𝑃(𝑟𝑘) is the probability of observing ranking 𝑟𝑘 in a pool of A candidates at school 
k.  
An important assumption underlying all of these models is that the choices that 
teachers and schools make must reveal their true preferences about one another. In some 
contexts, it can be beneficial not to rank the alternative that yields the highest utility first if 
the probability of actually being matched to that alternative is low. If strategic behaviors 
like this are in play, our estimates would be biased. On the teacher side, this violation is 
unlikely to be a concern due to three reasons. First, teachers do not rank schools. They 
simply need to apply. If they do not apply, they do not get to transfer. Thus, there is no 
incentive to be strategic if they want to transfer. Second, the cost of applying online is low. 
Even though some teachers may not think they have a chance of being hired at their most 
preferred school, the marginal cost of applying is close to zero since they only need to 
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submit the standardized resumés that have already been created when they first created 
their I&S profiles. Additionally, there is no customization or cover letter needed. Third, 
teachers cannot completely gauge how likely they will be eligible for automatic interviews. 
They do not see how their seniority is ranked relative to their competitors before submitting 
the application. While there is a possibility that early-career teachers may be discouraged 
enough by this seniority privilege that it deters them from applying to schools that are 
commonly perceived as desirable, we address this issue by controlling for teacher 
experience when we estimate teacher preferences. On the school side, there is a possibility 
of strategic behavior, but it is likely to be limited. Some schools may choose not to send 
the offer to the most preferred candidate to avoid the possibility that this candidate may 
stall the process by taking the full 48-hour period and let the offer expire without accepting 
or declining. In this 48-hour period, it is possible that the second most preferred candidate 
may have already received and accepted offers from other schools. While we cannot rule 
out this concern, we argue that the fact that the district allows teachers to make up to two 
moves (accepting an offer) during each round of I&S can help alleviate this concern.    
To empirically test whether there is evidence of strategic behavior on each side, we 
use the method in Hitsch et al. (2010) to split teachers and schools into ten quality bins and 
estimate the following regression: 
1[𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦]𝑖𝑘 = ∑ 𝛽𝑏
10
𝑏=1
· 1[𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑘 = 𝑏] +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑘                 (5) 
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where 1[apply] is a binary variable that takes value 1 if teacher i applies to school k; 
1[𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑘 = 𝑏] takes value 1 if the school that teacher i is considering whether to apply 
falls in to the 𝑏𝑡ℎ decile of school desirability as measured by the size of application pool 
and 0 if otherwise; 𝜇 is the teacher specific fixed effects; and 𝜖 is the random disturbance 
term. We estimate equation (5) for schools that fall into each quality bin separately using 
the information on whether teachers of different levels of teaching experience choose to 
apply there. We then plot the predicted probability of applying to a school against school 
quality separately by quintile of teacher experience in Panel A of Figure 2.2. Overall, we 
find evidence against strategic behavior since the predicted probability to apply mostly 
increases monotonically as school desirability rises regardless of applicant’s quality.  
On the school side, we estimate the following equation:  
1[𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡]𝑖𝑘 = ∑ 𝛼𝑏
10
𝑏=1
· 1[𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 = 𝑏] + 𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖 +  𝑢𝑘 + 𝑒𝑖𝑘                 (6) 
where 1[first] is a binary variable that takes value 1 if school k ranks teacher i first and 0 if 
otherwise; [𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 = 𝑏]  takes value 1 if teacher i falls in to the 𝑏
𝑡ℎ  decile of 
effectiveness and 0 if otherwise; autoint is an indicator of whether teacher i automatically 
qualifies for an interview; u is the position specific fixed effects; and e is the random 
disturbance term. In Panel B of Figure 2, we plot the predicted probability of ranking 
applicant first against applicant effectiveness separately by quintile of school quality. The 
overall conclusion is similar to the test on the teacher side.  
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V. Data 
The I&S data set contains information about every online action for every internal 
job posting in MPS from 2009 to 2015. Each record in this data set represents a potential 
match between applicant i from school j to position s at school k in year y. Each record 
contains the following information: job id, date of application, school id, round of 
application, applicant id, a ranking of seniority, whether applicant was selected for an 
interview, post-interview ranking, whether an offer was made, and whether the offer was 
accepted or rejected. Figures A.1 through A.4 present the basic descriptive statistics from 
the I&S data set. In 2014, I&S received roughly 3,000 applications from just under 500 
unique applicants for 300 postings. Between 2009 and 2015, the number of postings as 
well as the number of applicants interested in transferring increased markedly, especially 
after 2013. On average, this translates into larger application pools and more options for 
the schools to choose from. 
With the school and teacher identifiers from the I&S data set, we can establish a 
link with the administrative data sets to pull in additional information such as applicant 
attributes and school attributes, for both the sending and receiving schools, at multiple 
points in time. Teacher characteristics include, but are not limited to, gender, ethnicity, 
experience, and measures of effectiveness.15 Table 2.1 provides the summary statistics 
across four types of MPS teachers between 2009 and 2015. The first column represents 
                                  
15 We measure teacher effectiveness with a year-specific composite score that pools all available 
effectiveness measures from math value-added, reading value-added, classroom-observations, and student 
surveys for the year of application. For more information on the measure of effectiveness at MPS, see 
Appendix B. 
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every MPS teachers who ever participated in I&S. The second column includes teachers 
who never participated in I&S. The third and the fourth columns split I&S participants in 
the second column into two groups: those whose applications were unsuccessful and 
successful.16   
Between appliers and stayers (columns 1 and 2), there is little demographic 
difference. The most striking difference among them is that appliers tend to be significantly 
less effective. In terms of experience, these statistics confirm the results in Ahn (2015) that 
early to mid-career teachers are more likely to engage in search. One potential explanation 
for this pattern is the following. While seniority raises the probability of a successful 
transfer, the cumulative utility gain from a job transfer at the later stages of their careers 
may not be large enough to cover search costs.  If the intuition from Ahn (2015) that 
teachers start from low-quality schools, move to high-quality schools as they gain 
experience, and improve their match quality every successive match is correct, then one 
would expect the utility gain for late-career teachers to be low, which is reflected in a 
smaller fraction of high-experience teachers among the movers than among the stayers. In 
terms of sending-school attributes, appliers tend to apply away from schools that have 
higher proportions of non-white teachers and non-white students, lower average teacher 
experience, more likely to be a priority school than the schools that stayers remain at. 
Appliers search for schools that serve lower proportions of non-white students, have greater 
average years of teacher experience, higher school quality ratings, and higher student 
                                  
16 We define successful application as receiving at least one offer in each year of I&S. Therefore, 
unsuccessful applicants are those that reveal an intent to transfer but cannot because they do not receive any 
offers. 
 46 
 
achievement. These descriptive statistics confirm the patterns that are well documented in 
the teacher mobility literature. Among I&S applicants (columns 3 and 4), successful 
applicants tend to be younger, more likely to be white, significantly more effective, and 
more likely to be in their early to mid-career than unsuccessful applicants. They also tend 
to come from schools that have lower proportions of non-white teachers and non-white 
students, higher school quality ratings, and slightly higher student achievement in math.  
Analysis of applications data at the school level reveals four facts about internal 
teacher transfer and student disadvantage at MPS. 17  First, schools serving the least-
advantaged students get a third to a quarter as many applicants per opening as schools 
serving the most-advantaged students (Figure 2.3). Second, more-effective teachers are 
more likely to apply for transfer to schools serving more-advantaged students than schools 
serving less-advantaged students (Figure 2.4). The average applicant to the most-
advantaged schools has been about 0.2 standard deviations more effective than the average 
applicant to the least-advantaged schools. Third, schools across the spectrum of student 
advantage hire applicants who are substantially more effective than their average applicant, 
despite the fact that they do not systematically know applicants’ effectiveness ratings. This 
is evidence that all schools can recognize and do value effectiveness among applicants. 
The stable 0.2 standard deviation vertical distance between the blue and orange lines in 
Figure 2.4 expresses that all kinds of schools, regardless of student characteristics, hire 
transferring teachers who are substantially more effective than their average applicant. 
                                  
17 In figures 2.3 through 2.5, we classify schools using three measures of student disadvantage -- share 
students of color, share of students who are low-income as measured by receiving free or reduced price 
lunch, and share who are not proficient in reading. 
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Fourth, schools serving the most-advantaged students attract applicants with about 3 to 4 
more years of MPS teaching experience than schools serving the least-advantaged. In the 
next section, we further explore these phenomena with regression models.  
VI. Empirical Strategy 
Estimating Teacher Preferences 
To estimate teacher preferences for schools, we run the following logit model: 
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑦(𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑘 | 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑘 ) =  
𝑒𝑎
1 + 𝑒𝑎
 
where 
𝑎 = 𝑎0 + (𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑦 − 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑦)𝑎1 + 𝑇𝑖𝑦𝑎2 + 𝛿𝑦 + 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑦             (𝑇1) 
In this model, teacher i applies to position s at school k out of all the options she can apply 
to that are available to her in year y. For every active MPS teacher, we construct her choice 
set based on the vacancies in each year and each teacher’s licenses. For example, if a 
teacher is not licensed in elementary education in year y, postings at the elementary level 
in that year will not be included in her choice set. She cannot apply for those positions on 
I&S. As such, the choice set varies by teacher and by time. For teachers who did not apply, 
we assume they considered other alternatives available to them based on their licensing 
status and the licensing requirements for each posting but they chose to “apply” to their 
own position at their current school. On the contrary, we assume that teachers who 
participated in I&S considered a position at their current school but chose not to apply.  
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According to model T1, the probability that teacher i from school j in year y applies 
for a transfer to school k is a function of the differences between sending and receiving 
school characteristics (𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑦 − 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑦) , teacher i’s characteristics 𝑇𝑖𝑦  , year indicator 𝛿𝑦 , 
round indicator, and a random error term 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑦. We include teacher characteristics such as 
experience, effectiveness ratings, and race to control for heterogeneous tastes that may vary 
among teachers. School characteristics include the share of students and teachers of color, 
the share of students proficient in reading, pupil-teacher ratio, pupil-teacher aide ratio, 
priority school status, pay-for-performance bonus amount, commute time from teacher i’s 
home, enrollment, and the percentage of English language learners, special education, and 
low income students.  
To capture the effects of differential taste for each type of teacher, we introduce 
interactions between teacher characteristics and school characteristics:  
𝑎 = 𝑎0 + (𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑦 − 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑦)𝑎1 + 𝑇𝑖𝑦𝑎2 + 𝑇𝑖𝑦 ∗ (𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑦 − 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑦)𝑎3 + 𝛿𝑦 + 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 +
𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑦             (𝑇2). 
The interaction terms we explore are the interaction between teacher of color and percent 
of students of color, and the interactions between teacher effectiveness and pupil-teacher 
ratio, bonus amount, percent of student reading proficiency, and percent of students of 
color.  
 We also run specifications using conditional fixed effects logit models:  
𝑎 = 𝑎0 + (𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑦 − 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑦)𝑎1 + 𝛿𝑦 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑦             (𝑇3) 
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𝑎 = 𝑎0 + (𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑦 − 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑦)𝑎1 + 𝑇𝑖𝑦𝑎2 + 
 𝑇𝑖𝑦 ∗ (𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑦 − 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑦)𝑎3 + 𝛿𝑦 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑦             (𝑇4) 
where the teacher-specific fixed effects, 𝜃𝑖, allows us to compare each teacher’s choice to 
apply within herself over time, essentially differencing out all the time-invariant teacher-
specific tastes that may vary among teachers. We can still recover the effects of differential 
taste from the interaction terms in model T4. 
Estimating School Preferences 
On the school side, we use a rank-ordered logistic model to analyze how school 
select candidates. Formally, our rank-ordered logit model is given by  
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑦 (
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖 
| 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖 𝑤𝑎𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠
) =  
𝑒𝑏
1 + 𝑒𝑏
 
where 
𝑏 = 𝑏𝑜 + 𝑇𝑖𝑦𝑏1 + 𝜂𝑠𝑗𝑦 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑦             (𝑆1). 
Unlike in the case of teachers, the choice set for each school-posting pair is clearly defined. 
School j can only select candidates who apply to posting s at school j in year y in each 
round. This restriction is put in place with the posting fixed effects 𝜂𝑠𝑗𝑦. For each posting, 
school j ranks the candidates based on 𝑇𝑖𝑦, teacher characteristics. To incorporate as much 
information as possible, our preferred specifications do not separately estimate school 
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preferences at each stage of I&S.18 The dependent variable is an ordered ranking from 1 to 
4, where 1 is the highest ranking. Applicants who were screened out before the interview 
stage receive a censored ranking of zero. We omit automatic interview applicants who were 
not ranked in the top four because we cannot observe whether they were revealed preferred 
to other candidates who were not interviewed.19  Since we expect some within-receiving-
school serial correlations, we cluster the standard errors at the school level.  
VII. Results 
Teacher Preferences Results 
According to Table 2.2, teachers prefer to apply to schools with lower proportions 
of non-white students and teachers, higher average teacher experience, higher enrollment, 
higher reading achievement, lower pupil-teacher ratio, higher expected pay-for-
performance bonus amount, and schools that would reduce commute time from home. 
Overall, the magnitudes of the coefficients of school characteristics remain stable across 
specifications. On average, a one-minute increase in commute time and an additional 
student per teacher at receiving-school each reduces the probability of applying by one to 
two percent, confirming the earlier findings in the literature that these are among the most 
                                  
18 In the appendix, we provide estimation results from specifications that separately estimate school 
preferences by stage. For the resumé-screening stage, we run a logit regression with a dependent variable 
that is a binary choice whether to send an interview invitation to teacher i. For the post-interview stage, we 
rerun model S1 but only for the sample that progressed to the interview stage. 
19 An example of this problem is the following. If ten teachers apply, four automatically progress to the 
interview stage. Additional four will be chosen to be interviewed by the school. The remaining two are then 
screened out before the interview stage. We can say that the four applicants that the school chooses on its 
own are preferred to the two that are screened out. But we cannot say for certain that some of the four auto-
interview candidates, if unranked or ranked below any of the four chosen by the school after the interviews 
are conducted, are preferred to those two. 
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important school characteristics that determine teacher mobility. In terms of student body, 
a 10 percent increase in the share of students of color reduces the probability of applying 
by about 2 percent while a 10 percent increase in the share of students proficient in reading 
increases the probability of applying by 1.5 percent. Controlling for observable school 
characteristics, teachers are still about 4 to 7 percent less likely to apply to a priority school.  
In columns T2A, T2B, T4A, and T4B, we introduce interaction terms to investigate 
whether there is any heterogeneity in taste. We find that for every 10 percent increase in 
the share of students of color, teachers of color are 2.5 percent more likely to apply 
compared to white teachers. In terms of teacher effectiveness, there is no evidence that 
highly effective teachers prefer schools with high reading achievement more than low-
effectiveness teachers do. There is, however, evidence that highly effective teachers prefer 
schools with higher share of white students. For a 10 percent increase in the share of 
students of color, a teacher whose composite effectiveness rating is 1 standard deviation 
greater than the district mean is about 1 to 2 percent less likely to apply than an average 
teacher.  There is also evidence that more effective teachers prefer schools with greater 
expected pay-for-performance bonus amount.  
The log likelihood estimates from Table 2.2 allow us to calculate the bundle of 
school characteristics or monetary incentive that would make any type of teachers 
indifferent about working at any pair of schools. To do this, we first calculate the marginal 
rates of substitution (MRS) among school characteristics.20  Each cell in Table 2.3 is the 
                                  
20 Refer to Appendix C for the derivation of the marginal rates of substitution.  
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rate at which a teacher is ready to face a one unit increase in the column characteristic in 
exchange for the row characteristic while maintaining the same level of utility. Negative 
values indicate that the column characteristic must be forgone instead of received. For 
example, a priority school status requires a reduction of 47 percentage points in the share 
of students of color to keep utility constant. This reduction is not only impractically large 
but also unrealistic since student demographics are not controlled by school districts. 
Instead, we can fully or partially neutralize a priority school status by changing other school 
characteristics, even multiple at once. The district may decrease the number of students per 
teacher at that school by roughly 2.25 students and provide any applicant to that school a 
bonus of 116 dollars each year. Alternatively, the district can also just provide any 
applicant to that school a bonus of 332 dollars each year without altering the pupil-teacher 
ratio.  
We propose two methods of calculating the dollar values of school characteristics. 
The first method is to derive the dollar values directly from the variation in the pay-for-
performance bonus amount at schools that adopted Quality Compensation law (Q Comp) 
prior to 2011. The dollar value of each one unit of school characteristic is simply its 
coefficient divided by the coefficient of pay-for-performance amount. These dollar values 
are presented in the first column of Table 2.3. The second method is to use teacher 
preference for commute time that we estimate in Table 2.2 and the average value of travel 
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time savings (VTTS) established in the transportation literature. Essentially, we multiply 
column 2 of Table 3 with the cost of time and the number of trips per year.21  
To demonstrate how our calculations can be used in practice, we compute the 
changes in three policy levers required to create indifference about working at high and 
low achieving schools for different types of teachers. We begin by presenting the average 
school characteristics of two types of schools in Table 2.4. Schools in the bottom quintile 
of student reading proficiency have roughly half the total enrollments and serve three times 
as many students of color and low-income students as schools in the top quintile. Teachers 
at bottom-quintile schools have 6.5 fewer years of experience and about 9 fewer students 
than teachers at top-quintile schools. The pupil-teacher aide ratio at top quintile schools is 
roughly triple that of bottom quintile schools. Using these average school characteristics, 
we present the changes required at bottom-quintile schools to make them as desirable as 
top-quintile schools in Table 2.5. To attract an average MPS teacher working in top-quintile 
schools, the district must increase pay at bottom-quintile schools by $700 each year or 
reduce pupil-teacher ratio by 17. To attract a teacher whose composite effectiveness rating 
is 1 standard deviation greater than the mean, the pay must increase to $1,424 and the pupil-
teacher ratio must decrease by 25. There is congruence between the two methods of 
calculating the dollar values of school attributes. The cost of change pupil-teacher ratio is 
orders of magnitude greater than the pay increase. This result does not imply that pupil-
teacher ratio is not important for teachers. Our estimates in Table 2.2 indicate that it is one 
                                  
21 The nationwide average VTTS is estimated to be around $22.9 per hour between 2008 and 2010 
(Belenky 2011).  
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of the most important school characteristics that drive teacher mobility. It is that bottom-
quintile schools already have low pupil-teacher ratio. Further reducing becomes expensive 
and even impossible in some cases.  
School Preferences Results 
Throughout all stages of I&S, schools prefer candidates who are female, younger, 
white, holding an advanced degree, and effective (Table 2.6).22 The probability that a 
teacher receives a higher ranking increases by 4 percent if she holds an advanced degree. 
This probability increases by about 6 to 7 percent for every 1 standard deviation increase 
in the composite effectiveness ratings. This result is evidence that schools can detect 
effective teachers even though they do not systematically know teachers’ effectiveness 
ratings. Breaking down the effectiveness measures into its three components reveals that it 
is the SOEI ratings that primarily drive this result. Schools also prefer candidates who have 
no history of school-hopping. For two identical teachers, the one who stayed one additional 
year longer at her past schools would have a 2 percent increase in the probability of 
receiving a higher ranking. Experience is a positive trait, but the coefficients are not 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. We do not find evidence that schools with a 
higher share of students of color prefer teachers of color more than white teachers. 
Separately estimating school preferences by stage of I&S reveals that school 
preferences change with the information available to them. Controlling for who receives 
                                  
22 Our results remain stable with an alternative ranking where automatic interview applicants who were not 
ranked after the interviews are assigned the maximum ranking within the interview pool plus one (Table 
A.4) 
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automatic interview invitations, schools are more likely to move candidates who hold an 
advanced degree and have no history of school-hopping, and candidates who are younger, 
white, highly-effective, and in their late-career to the interview stage. Teachers whose 
composite effectiveness ratings are 1 standard deviation above the district mean are 3 
percent more likely to receive an interview invitation.23 Interestingly, it is the student 
survey component, rather than the SOEI or value-added scores, that drives this effect. 
Having an advanced degree increases the probability of receiving an interview invitation 
by about 6 percent. Having over 10 years of teaching experience increases the probability 
of receiving an interview invitation by over 15 percent. Controlling for years of experience, 
a one year longer tenure at past schools increases the probability of progressing to the 
interview stage by 3 percent, confirming our records from interviewing with MPS 
principals. However, it is rather surprising that the coefficients of some of the 
demographics are statistically significant. Information about them is either limited or 
missing at the resumé-screening stage. For age and race, the only way this information is 
revealed on the resumés is through names and date of birth.  
After the interviews are conducted, schools start to pay less attention to the “signal” 
characteristics. The effects of experience and school-hopping history are indistinguishable 
from zero. The magnitude of the effects of holding an advanced degree decreases by more 
than half. On the other hand, the effects of age, being female, and effectiveness ratings all 
                                  
23 While the effectiveness ratings are never shared on resumés (or at any point in the I&S process). Their 
statistically significant positive effects indicate that school leaders prefer certain characteristics—
unobserved by the econometrician—that are positively correlated with effectiveness ratings. Examples of 
these characteristics that may appear on the resumés are willingness to participate in additional professional 
development and the quality of their references. 
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increase in magnitude after the interview, possibly because more information about these 
characteristics is revealed in an in-person setting. An additional year of age reduces the 
probability obtaining a higher ranking by just under 1 percent. Being female now increases 
the probability of ranking higher by 4 percent. Having a composite effectiveness rating that 
is 1 standard deviation greater than the district mean increases the probability of ranking 
higher by 7 percent, almost double of its effect at the resumé-screening stage. There is also 
evidence that schools only exhibit preference for early offers candidates who tend to be 
high-performing and were pre-screened by the district only after the interview stage, not 
before.  
We also find that being eligible for an automatic interview hurts the chance of being 
hired by schools once a candidate finds herself in the interview stage. All else equal, 
automatically qualifying for an interview decreases the probability of obtaining a higher 
ranking by almost 5 percent. We interpret this negative effect of the automatic interview 
eligibility as a potential loss of efficiency. On the school side, if the pool of application is 
sufficiently large, there may be some other high-quality candidates that the school may 
want to interview but cannot because the automatic interview candidates take up half of 
the available interview slots already. Theoretically, if a school has perfect information at 
the resumé-screening stage, it only needs to choose one applicant to interview. But, in this 
case, the interview stage would be superfluous. In the I&S context,  schools do use 
information gathered through interviews, for better or worse, and the option to freely 
choose four or five other candidates may not be enough to guarantee that they can include 
the most desirable candidate in the interview pool. It is possible that more desirable 
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candidates are not included in the interview pool because of incomplete information. On 
the teacher side, teachers who are highly desirable but are not eligible for an automatic 
interview would not have a chance to transfer to a school that would give them higher 
utility. 
VIII. Conclusion 
Estimating teacher and school preferences reveals that a large part of the sorting 
patterns we observe first stems from teacher preferences in the application stage. These 
patterns are then reinforced further by school preferences in the later stages of hiring. At 
the beginning of the hiring process, we find that teachers prefer schools with characteristics 
previously found to be desirable in many other contexts. As the hiring process progresses 
to where schools make decisions, we find that, when given the opportunity to make their 
own hiring decisions, schools general prefer candidates who are effective, holding an 
advanced degree, and not in their early-career. With these results in mind, it is not 
surprising why we observe the sorting patterns documented in many US school districts.  
While these results are troubling since many of the school characteristics that 
teachers prefer are difficult to change in the short term, our study suggests that there is 
room for policy interventions that may be able to alter final hiring outcomes in a more 
immediate fashion. First, introducing an appropriate amount of monetary incentives at 
hard-to-staff schools may help attract more candidates and expand the choice set of these 
schools. We propose two methods to compute the appropriate amount of bonus to attract 
any type of teacher to any type of school. The size of the estimated bonus amount suggests 
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that simply restoring the original pay-for-performance regime that was previously defeated 
district-wide at the end of 2010 is not sufficient to attract even an average teacher. 
Moreover, the amount of expected bonus can scale up considerably if the hard-to-staff 
schools need to attract teachers who need to relocate from far away. Second, supplying 
additional information about the applicants right at the resumé-screening stage can help 
reduce the likelihood that hard-to-staff schools miss out on quality candidates. Supplying 
more information can improve market efficiency, but whether it will improve or worsen 
the problem of inequitable distribution of teacher quality may depend on which schools 
receive the treatment. We leave this research question to future field experiments. Lastly, 
another potential policy lever is the transfer rule that currently favors seniority. We find 
evidence that schools exhibit strong distaste for candidates who automatically qualify for 
an interview. This confirms our discussions with school leaders that they would rather 
select every interviewee instead of letting the algorithm select half of them. With a large 
pool of applicants, the likelihood that schools can miss out on candidates that they would 
have preferred in the interview stage increases. If completely removing such rule is 
politically impossible, a more efficient automatic interview rule likely will have to take the 
size of the application pool into account.  
We believe a number of next steps would improve this line of research. First, 
additional simulation exercises that take the estimated preferences as inputs may help shed 
light on how certain features of the teacher labor market affect teacher welfare, the 
efficiency of the teacher labor market, and the distribution of quality teachers. Estimating 
the effects of changing the seniority policy or the maximum number of candidates allowed 
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in the interview pool may yield helpful insights for school districts and additional policy 
options that may prove more politically feasible than drastically changing school attributes 
or introducing pay-for-performance regimes. Second, given our preliminary findings that 
sometimes school leaders “miss out” on applicants who would have been highly preferred 
had they not been rejected at the resumé-screening stage, it is worth investigating further 
whether combining this kind of multi-stage hiring dataset with a value-of-a-hire prediction 
algorithm under a careful consideration of the appropriate counterfactuals can help improve 
hiring decisions. Similar to the way Kleinberg et al. (2017) shows how machine learning 
algorithms and econometrics can help improve bail decisions, it would be of great practical 
value to see how much prediction algorithms can help school leaders reduce the chance 
that they reject the wrong candidates before they have the chance to interview them.    
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Chapter 3: 
Air Pollution and Academic Performance: Using a Natural Experiment in the Dallas-
Fort Worth Metroplex 
I. Introduction 
Does air pollution affect academic performance? While air pollution has long been 
associated with a vast number of negative health outcomes, killing nearly 4,000 people 
daily in China and responsible for at least 200,000 premature mortalities in the United 
States each year, little is known about its impact on learning and skill development 
(Caiazzo et al., 2013,  Rohde and Muller, 2015). From an economic point of view, school-
aged children are at the heart of the process of human capital formation for any modern 
economy. Although most efforts are focused on directly improving the quality of 
education, the effectiveness of these interventions may be limited if children's capacity to 
learn is adversely affected by air pollution. Moreover, since air quality regulations have 
historically been tied almost exclusively to the impact of air pollution on premature 
mortalities, the gains from improving air quality may currently be underestimated if there 
is indeed a causal relationship between air pollution and skill development. 
Only recently have researchers begun to discover the adverse effects of air pollution 
beyond health outcomes. Each pollutant may affect learning via different channels. For 
example, particulate matter and ground-level ozone (O3) aggravate asthmatic and 
respiratory symptoms in at-risk children, while nitrogen dioxide ( NO2 ) and carbon 
monoxide (CO) impair brain development, working memory, and neurological and 
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cognitive functioning (Sunyer et al. 2015). If air pollution leads to reduced academic 
performance, adult outcomes of affected children may be at risk since they would be ranked 
below their peers, not because of their true capabilities, but because of an external factor 
that can be mitigated. To date, researchers have been able to convincingly link early-age 
learning and health outcomes to adult consequences (Chetty et al., 2011; Currie and 
Thomas, 2001; Currie et al., 2008). The potentially large negative externalities that have 
never been accounted for and the small but growing evidence in this emerging theme of 
research linking air pollution to important non-health outcomes warrant the need to 
empirically assess the relationship between air pollution and academic performance. 
Estimating the impact of air pollution on any outcome remains a challenging task 
because the variation in the exposure to air pollution is rarely exogenous. Much of the 
variation in the levels of air pollution comes from human activities. Therefore, it is possible 
that using observational pollution data without any identification strategy can lead to 
finding a positive impact of air pollution on health and educational outcomes since much 
of the variation in air quality comes from economic activity, which can influence these 
other outcomes by other means. In addition to the nonrandom causes of the variation in air 
quality, some individuals may also determine their own exposure to air pollution. Chay and 
Greenstone (2005) demonstrate that individuals do in fact sort themselves based on their 
preference for clean air. Even in the same geographical area, optimizing individuals may 
still behave in a certain way to reduce their exposure to harmful pollutants by using air 
pollution index forecasts to plan on staying indoors on days with high levels of air pollution 
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(Aldy and Bind 2013; Neidell 2004; Neidell 2009). If left unaddressed, this selection effect 
can greatly understate the full welfare cost of air pollution.   
To address these concerns, this paper exploits an exogenous change in the 
concentrations of air pollutants after the closure of Terminal E at Dallas/Fort Worth 
International Airport (DFW) after Delta Airlines (Delta) filed for bankruptcy in 2005 
(DFW 2004). The basic idea is that the terminal closure would lead to a decline in 
enplanement, which would then lead to a decline in the concentrations of air pollutants in 
the areas around the airport. The identification assumption is that the closure affected 
student achievement only through air quality and that the closure was unrelated to other 
factors that could determine student achievements in the schools around DFW.24 Using 
monitor-level air pollution data, I find that the terminal closure led to a significant decline 
in the levels of NO2 and particulate matters up to 2.5 micrometer in size (PM-2.5) around 
DFW relative to the rest of Texas at the time of closure, but not for other pollutants (Figures 
3.1 and 3.2).  
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, it adds robust evidence to a small 
but growing literature on the effects of air pollution beyond health outcomes by exploiting 
a natural experiment. Using multiple comparison groups and multiple time periods, I 
employ difference-in-differences (DID) estimation to show that the test scores of test takers 
                                  
24 In theory, aircraft noise can also affect learning. A review by Klatte et al. (2013) indicates that mixed 
results are reported with respect to chronic effects on children’s attention. While some studies have found a 
negative association between aircraft noise and reading performance, the authors note that insufficient 
control of student demographics and the existence of performance-enhancing effects of noise suggest that 
the harmful effects are likely small in magnitude. In this study, the closure of Terminal E affected both 
math and reading scores, separately. This finding suggests that aircraft noise is unlikely to be the main 
cause since, if it has any effect on test scores, it tends to affect only reading comprehension.   
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near the DFW area improved from 1.6 to 2.8 percent of a standard deviation relative to the 
rest of Texas and that this improvement is unique to the impact of the closure of Terminal 
E. Second, this paper provides new evidence that air pollution affects different types of test 
takers differently. Particularly, the effects are more pronounced among high-performing 
high school students and low-performing elementary school students.  
A brief outline of this paper is as follows. In section II, I provide the background 
and literature review on air pollution research, and the context of the closure of Terminal 
E. In section III, I describe the data, the construction of key variables, and present the 
summary statistics of test takers and the levels of air pollution from the pre-closure and 
post-closure periods in the DFW area as well as in other parts of Texas. In section IV, I 
discuss the empirical challenges and describe my strategies to overcome them. In section 
V, I discuss my empirical results. Section VI concludes with a discussion of the 
implications of these results for education and environmental policy. 
II. Background 
How Air Pollution Affects Learning 
The evidence from the fields of epidemiology and health economics points to the 
fact that air pollution is a threat to learning. Air pollution affects children’s academic 
performance through three main mechanisms: student absenteeism due to respiratory 
illnesses, reduced cognitive functioning, and behavioral issues. Every major air pollutant 
commonly found in the ambient atmosphere has been documented to be positively 
associated with student absenteeism. Currie et al. (2009) finds that higher levels of CO 
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significantly increase student absenteeism in Texas even in areas that passed the national 
air quality standards. In a study in Helsingki, Ponka (1990) finds that ambient levels of 
SO2 and NO2 are positively associated with the student absenteeism and the number of 
upper respiratory infections observed in school-aged children. Particulate matters have 
been associated with absence rates in grade 1 to 6 in a study in Utah Valley (Ransom and 
Pope 1992). Gilliland, et al. (2001) find that high concentrations of ozone are correlated 
with student absenteeism. There has also been mounting evidence that asthmatic children 
miss school more than non-asthmatic children, with differences ranging from one day to 
one full week of school (Fowler, Davenport, Garg 1992). Some of the impact may also be 
irreversible. In the longest study of air pollution and children health in Southern California, 
Gauderman et al. (2004) find that teenagers in smoggy communities were nearly five times 
as likely to have clinically low lung function compared to those living in less polluted 
communities. Lung function deficits would lower the child’s ability to recover from a cold 
and increase the risk of respiratory diseases.  
Air pollution can also affect learning through mechanisms that do not involve 
respiratory diseases. Air pollutants such as NO2can affect brain development, memory, and 
cognitive and neurological functioning. Sunyer et al. (2015) find that children who attend 
schools in areas with lower levels of NO2experienced a 11.5 percent 12-month increase in 
working memory but those who attended schools in areas with higher levels of 
NO2experienced only a 7.4 percent 12-month increase.  
Air pollution can also trigger symptoms or behaviors that inhibit learning at school. 
Bussing et al. (1995) found that children with severe asthma alone were nearly three times 
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more likely to have severe behavioral problems than children without any chronic 
condition. In a cohort of 1,619 inner-city students in Rochester, New York, the parents 
reported that their children with persistent asthma scored worse on peer interactions and 
task orientation, and were more likely to exhibit shy and anxious behaviors compared to 
non-asthmatic children (Halterman et al. 2006). Given the evidence that air pollution can 
aggravate asthmatic symptoms, there are reasons to believe that it may lead to more 
behavioral problems at school for asthmatic students as well.  
Overview of the Empirical Literature 
The first strand of research on air pollution exploits quasi-experiments such as 
abrupt policy changes, random variations in traffic congestion, and closures of a major 
point-source polluter to estimate the impact of air pollution. In one of the most influential 
studies on air pollution and infant health, Chay and Greenstone (2003) uses non-attainment 
status as an instrumental variable to estimate the value of clean air and show that the 
instrumental variables estimates are much larger in magnitude. Moretti and Neidell (2009) 
uses boat traffic as an instrumental variable for air pollution. They argue that boat traffic 
near the ports of Los Angeles is highly correlated with air pollution but is largely 
determined by external factors beyond the control of the local residents. Schlenker and 
Walker (2016) exploits exogenous change in airport traffic congestion at eight largest US 
airports and finds that a one standard deviation increase in airport congestion increases the 
level of CO by 19 percent. In addition, they connect this finding to measures of health and 
found that taxi time, asthma and respiratory admissions are strongly related.  
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While researchers have extensively documented the relationship between air 
pollution and health outcomes, the existing literature on the relationship between air 
pollution and student achievement is extremely limited. Most papers focus on student 
absenteeism as the main outcome (Chen et al., 2000; Currie et al., 2009; Ponka, 1990; 
Gilliland et al., 2001; Ransom and Pope, 1992). Only recently have researchers begun to 
study the impact of air pollution on student achievement. Using individual level data and 
community air pollution data from the longitudinal respiratory health study of Southern 
California school children, Ham, Zweig, and Avol (2014) find economically significant 
impact of particulate pollution and NO2 on student performance on the California 
standardized test scores. Lavy, Ebenstein, and Roth (2012) finds that short-term exposure 
to PM-2.5 and CO is associated with a significant decline in the probability of receiving 
the Bagrut high school matriculation certificate in Israel.  
There are, however, mixed findings even for this new strand of research. For 
example, using a difference-in-difference-in-differences method, Currie et al. (2009) find 
a strong impact of CO on student absenteeism but finds mixed effects for particulate 
pollution in Texas schools during between 1996 and 2001. In contrast, Chen et al. (2000) 
find no impact of air pollution in general but a beneficial impact on student absenteeism in 
some specifications. Using a sudden closure of a steel mill in Utah Valley and temperature 
inversion, Ransom (1995) finds that particulate pollution had a strong impact on school 
absenteeism while CO had an unexpected beneficial impact even in their instrumental 
variable estimation models. Finally, Chen, et al. (2000) and Gilliland, et al. (2001) find 
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beneficial effects of particulate pollution on school attendance. Confounding from other 
pollutants and weak identification strategies may drive these confusing results.  
Background on the Closure of Terminal E  
In 2005, DFW was the third busiest airport in the world enplanement and 
deplanement, handling over 700,000 operations in a year (ACI, 2005). In February of 2005, 
Delta Airlines closed its entire DFW hub located at Terminal E. The decision to close the 
hub was not due to the economic outlook of the Northern Texas economy. In fact, the 
county-level unemployment rates for counties surrounding DFW actually decreased 
slightly after the closure (BLS, 2005). Rather, the decision came at a time when Delta had 
already been struggling to maintain its own financial adequacy. Initially, closing the DFW 
hub and reallocating resources to the Atlanta hub was part of Delta’s plan to avoid 
bankruptcy, which inevitably still happened in September of 2005.  
As a result, Delta decreased daily departures at Terminal E from 254 to 18 and the 
number of leased gates went down from 28 to 4 (DFW, 2006). The closure led to 
approximately 11 percent year-over-year decline in the number of flights (DFW, 2006). It 
is possible that the closure could have led to job losses among parents of students attending 
schools near DFW. One could imagine that a closure-induced unemployment spell or 
income losses to the parents could indirectly hurt their children’s academic performance. 
Tthe impact is likely to be limited since DFW board publically made a commitment that 
the affected DFW 1,700 employees would not be terminated (DFW, 2004). Additionally, 
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there was even a slight unexpected increase in the 2006 passenger levels of 0.2% from 
2005 (DFW, 2006).  
III. Data 
Air Pollution Data 
To demonstrate that air pollution around DFW did in fact decline relative to the 
levels observed in other areas, I use hourly pollution concentrations at the monitor level 
from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for four types of air pollutants: PM-2.5, 
CO, O3, and NO2. For each monitor that was operating on a particular day, I calculate the 
daily pollution level by averaging the readings from 06:00 to 17:00 to approximate 
children’s exposure to air pollution at school. To map daily pollution levels to an area, I 
follow the method described in Currie et al. (2009) and calculate the weighted mean 
pollution level using an inverse distance weighted formula to assign a higher weight to the 
monitors that are located closer to the area. The formula used to calculate the weighted 
daily mean at any area is the following: 
 
𝑃𝑎 =
∑
1
𝑑𝑖𝑎
∝ 𝑃𝑖
𝑗
𝑖=1
∑
1
𝑑𝑘𝑎
∝
𝑗
𝑘=1
             (1) 
where 𝑃𝑎 is the mean pollution level at area a for the past t days before the test, d is the 
distance from each monitor to area a, 𝑃𝑖 is the mean pollution level at monitor i for the past 
t days before the test, and j are the total number of monitors within a 10-mile radius, and α 
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is assumed to be 2. For accuracy, I only include the data from monitors within 10 miles 
from each area. 
Air Pollution Concentrations around the Closure of Terminal E 
Using (1), I can also calculate the pollution levels around DFW over time and show 
that the closure of Terminal E was a pollution shock specific to DFW. According to Figure 
3.1, most pollutants exhibited an overall long term decline in the concentrations, which 
could be due to improvements in aircraft and cars engine technology. The decline of 
NO2 and CO appeared to have coincided with the closure of Terminal E. However, Figure 
3.2 demonstrates that, relative to the rest of Texas, only NO2 and PM-2.5 experienced a 
sharp decline right around the closure of Terminal E.25 Even if technological advancements 
slowly lowered the levels of NO2 and PM-2.5 everywhere over time, Figure 3.2 shows that 
the levels of NO2 and PM-2.5 clearly fell more in DFW than in other areas at the time when 
Terminal E was closed. These graphical results support my identification strategy that 
exploits the exogenous change in the levels air pollution stemming from the closure of 
Terminal E.  
Test Scores Data 
I use the school-grade level assessment results from TAKS in Math and English 
Language Arts (ELA) as measures of academic performance. TAKS is a standardized state 
examination administered between February and April from 2003-2010 in Texas. TAKS 
                                  
25 There appears to be a break in the upward trend in CO right at the time of the closure as well.  
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was used in grade 3 to 10 to assess student attainment of reading, writing, mathematics, 
science, and social studies skills required under Texas education standards. These high-
stake standardized assessments were used widely by public universities in Texas as one of 
the admissions criteria. Some universities used minimum TAKS scores requirement to 
determine admission eligibility. Hence, performing well on the TAKS was critical for 
students who intended to further pursue their education at the college level.  
TAKS assessments are appropriate for this study because they were strictly 
administered on the same day across all public schools in Texas.26 Unlike in California 
where high-stake assessments are often administered within testing windows, the Texas 
testing calendars allow for a more accurate estimation of the impact of air pollution on 
academic performance. This unique characteristic ensures that my estimates reflect only 
the effect of pollution levels measured before the assessments were administered. Using 
this feature, I can also test for the differences in the magnitude of the effects over time. 
To construct the test scores dataset, I obtain the Texas testing calendars for all 
public schools in Texas during 2004-2007 from Texas Education Agency. Then, I select 
only the assessments that were strictly administered on a specific date throughout Texas 
and collected the relevant testing information such as testing dates, grades, and subjects for 
each of the selected assessments. For comparability with other empirical studies, I include 
only the information from the assessments that were in English. This set of testing 
                                  
26 I have contacted Texas Education Agency to ensure that retests and make-up sessions that may have 
taken place on other unofficial testing dates were rare and excluded from the main dataset used in this 
paper. 
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information is then merged with the assessment results and socioeconomic characteristics 
of test takers obtained from the TAKS Aggregate Data System. This paper will use raw 
score, passing rate, and commended performance rate as the three main outcome 
variables.27 The TAKS Aggregate Data System also contains information regarding the 
characteristics and demographics of the test takers at the school-grade level for each 
assessment that took place, allowing me to control for potential confounders such as 
socioeconomic level, race, and gender composition among the students that may have 
varied around the same time that Terminal E was closed.  
Summary Statistics 
Although there are a number of major airports in Texas, no single comparison group 
is perfect. Therefore, this paper will present the results from using multiple comparison 
groups: all schools outside the DFW area, and all schools located within a 5-mile radius 
from Austin-Bergstrom International Airport (Austin), George Bush Intercontinental 
Airport (IAH), William P. Hobby Airport (Hobby) and San Antonio International Airport 
(San Antonio).  
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics of the school-grade observations from 
schools located within a 5-mile radius from DFW as well as from schools in other areas of 
Texas before and after the closure of Terminal E. I label observations that took place from 
2006 to 2008 as being after the closure of Terminal E since the terminal closed in February 
                                  
27 TAKS Aggregate Data System also provides data on absence rate on test day. Due to many zero values, 
my main models may not be appropriate to estimate the effects on absences. See appendix A for absence 
results. 
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and most TAKS assessments were administered in February through April. There was too 
little time for the effect to materialize in 2005. In the DFW setting, test takers were 
predominantly white and were less economically disadvantaged than other areas. Even 
though most of the statistically different means of the variables in Table 3.1 were small in 
magnitude, their variations across time may cause biases if not controlled for. Therefore, I 
will control for the changes in the composition of test takers in all of my regression models. 
IV. Identification Strategy 
To compute the difference-in-differences (DID) estimates, I compare the test scores 
from the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) from schools that are located 
near DFW to that of schools that are located elsewhere immediately before and after the 
closure of Terminal E. The DID specification is given by the following equation: 
𝑌𝑠𝑔,𝑑 = 𝛽1𝑃𝑠𝑔,𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑥𝑃𝑠 + 𝐷𝑠,𝑔 + 𝐷𝑦,𝑔 + 𝐷𝑑 + 𝐷𝑚 + 𝜃𝑋𝑠𝑔,𝑑 + ԑ𝑠𝑔,𝑑     
(1) 
where 𝑌𝑠𝑔,𝑑 is the standardized TAKS scores for school s grade g on day d; 𝑃𝑠𝑔,𝑑 is an 
indicator for test dates that were after Terminal E closure; 𝑇𝑠 is an indicator for being near 
DFW; 𝑇𝑠𝑥𝑃𝑠𝑔,𝑑 is an indicator for being near DFW and being after the closure of Terminal 
E; 𝐷𝑠𝑔 is a vector of school-grade fixed effects; 𝐷𝑦,𝑔 is a vector of year-grade fixed effects; 
𝐷𝑑  is a vector of day-of-week fixed effects; 𝐷𝑚 is a vector of month fixed effects; and 𝑋𝑠𝑔,𝑑 
is a vector of school-grade level socioeconomic controls.  
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The year-grade fixed effects help account for the variation in the difficulty of the 
assessments given to each grade in each year. These fixed effects also help account for 
unobserved economic activities at the aggregate level that could influence both academic 
performance and pollution levels. The school-grade fixed effects allow me to compare the 
effects of air pollution on academic performance within each grade at each school over 
time. Additionally, these school-grade fixed effects can account for the variations in test 
scores and health outcomes that could come from age and control for other school-grade 
specific unobserved characteristics, such as the quality of air filter system in school 
buildings, the quality of education provided, the fixed geographical characteristics of 
schools, and the time of day and the intensity of physical education classes.  
Although the school-grade fixed effects should account for much of the variation 
coming from the qualities and abilities among the test takers within the same school-grade 
unit, the composition of test takers may change over time due to reasons such as absence 
on test date and sorting (Table 3.1). As such, I include demographic controls in my 
regression models to account for potential omitted variable bias stemming from variations 
in the composition of test takers. Month fixed effects are included to control for the 
variation in seasonal weather patterns and pollen counts that may affect student health. 
Lastly, day-of-week fixed effects would capture the effects of fatigue.  
The causal effect of the closure of Terminal E at DFW on 𝑌𝑠𝑔,𝑑  is the estimated by 
𝛽3   regardless of any other trends in student achievement that could have occurred at the 
time when Terminal E was closed. All of my regression models are weighted either by the 
number of test takers and/or the distance away from the airport. Observations with a larger 
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number of test takers and observations located closer to a nearby airport receive more 
weight to focus on population with more intense exposure to air pollution from the airport. 
Standard errors are clustered at the school level as I expect that there may be serial 
correlations in unobservables over time within schools. 
V. Results 
After conducting robustness checks, I find that the closure led to a 1.0 to 2.8 percent 
of a standard deviation increase in the TAKS assessments scores and a 3.7 to 7.3 percent 
increase in the proportion of students with commended performance (Table 3.2).  In other 
words, if I compare the TAKS scores of test takers attending schools located near DFW to 
those of test takers attending schools located elsewhere immediately before Terminal E 
was closed, the former rose between 1 and 2.8 percent of a standard deviation faster than 
the latter a year after the terminal was closed.  
The effects are also heterogeneous across my samples (Table 3.3). I find that the 
closure led to a larger percentage increase in the scores among high-school-age test takers 
than in the elementary-school-age test takers. While the effect on the passing rate is not 
distinguishable from zero for an average test taker, I find that, among elementary-school-
age test takers, the closure led to a statistically significant 0.8 to 5.2 percent increase in the 
passing rate.  
To further test the strength of my identification strategy, I conduct two additional 
robustness checks. First, I add unit-specific time trend variables to (1). So, (1) becomes 
𝑌𝑠𝑔,𝑑 = 𝛽1𝑃𝑠𝑔,𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑥𝑃𝑠 + 𝛽4τsg,d 
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                                       + 𝐷𝑠,𝑔 + 𝐷𝑦,𝑔 + 𝐷𝑑 + 𝐷𝑚 + 𝜃𝑋𝑠𝑔,𝑑 + ԑ𝑠𝑔,𝑑                    (2) 
where 𝜏 is an interaction between treatment, which is being near DFW, and a time trend 
variable. This specification tests whether the parallel assumption is violated. That is, I 
allow each area to have its own linear time trend. I find that 𝛽4 is not statistically different 
from zero and the estimates of 𝛽3 on the TAKS scores remain mostly the same and the 
estimates on the TAKS passing rate continue to be statistically insignificant (Table 
3.4).While the estimates on the commended performance rate declined considerably for all 
comparison groups, almost all are still statistically significant. The second test uses a 
placebo treatment variable. Instead of using 2006 to indicate post-closure status, I use 2004 
to estimate (1) instead. Theoretically, I should not be able to detect any effect if the terminal 
did not close until 2005. As expected, all estimates except one from the Austin sample are 
statistically and economically insignificant as shown in Table 3.5. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the closure of Terminal E, which 
improved the air quality around the schools located near DFW, led to a small but 
statistically significant increase in the achievement of students near DFW. Using terminal 
closure as an exogenous treatment of improved air quality, I employ DID estimation and 
estimate the effect of the closure to be between 1.0 to 2.8 percent of a standard deviation 
increase in the TAKS assessments scores and a 3.7 to 7.3 percent increase in the proportion 
of students with commended performance. While the effects are larger among students at 
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the higher end of the score distribution, I find that effects on the lower end of the score 
distribution are also present among elementary school students. For these younger test 
takers, the closure led to between a 0.8 to 5.2 percent increase in the TAKS passing rate. 
These results suggest that air pollution affects students heterogeneously. Its effects are 
larger on the high performing older students and on the low performing younger students. 
The policy implications are three-fold. First, policymakers may need to factor air 
pollution into the decision of whether to allow new schools, kindergartens, or daycare 
facilities to be built near areas such as busy intersections, airports, and highways where the 
level of NO2 tends to be high due to burning of fuel. This paper shows that the closure of 
an airport terminal does affect student achievement in the areas close to the airport. This 
result is consistent with earlier findings on the impact of air pollution on hospital 
admissions in the areas near airports in California (Schlenker and Walker, 2016). For 
regulators of airports, reducing aircraft idling time and flight delays can be beneficial for 
the lives of students around the area. 
Second, the findings in this paper stress the need to further promote EPA's Indoor 
Air Quality (IAQ) management programs for more schools to adopt EPA's recommended 
best practices and educate students and their parents about the negative effects of air 
pollution on students' health at school and on academic performance. The effort to promote 
IAQ may especially be needed in schools with high proportions of economically 
disadvantaged students as this paper shows that the impact is disproportionately larger for 
these groups of students. In addition, the EPA can also encourage more schools to subscribe 
to its air quality index forecast program. With the IAQ program and air pollution forecasts 
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available to them, more schools will be able to take preventative measures based on the air 
pollution forecasts and make certain that they advise teachers to prevent asthmatic students 
or students with acute respiratory symptoms from doing strenuous activities outdoors on 
days with high levels of NO2.  
Third, EPA may need to revisit the national standard for NO2. While the levels of 
NO2  in the US have declined dramatically in the past three decades, there is not been 
scientific evidence to ensure that long-term exposure to low levels of NO2 is safe or that 
the costs of lowering the standards further exceed the benefits. While the current levels 
may no longer be the primary cause of premature mortality, this paper adds to the small 
but growing literature which shows that long-term exposure to low levels of NO2 can create 
a negative externality to the society through reduced student achievement. 
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Illustrations 
Table 1.1: Summary statistics of dependent variables 
Frequency of Monthly 
Service Requests in a 
Census Tract 
2005-2009 2010-2014 
t-statistic Mean SD Max Mean SD Max 
Sewer blockage and street 
light outage 
9.50 12.1 597 8.06 10.9 750 -30.3 
Electricity outage and 
heating complaints 
10.9 22.4 493 10.5 25.8 3638 -4.22 
N 108,577 133,334  
 
Table 1.2: Summary statistics of proxy variables and instrumental variables 
 2005-2009 2010-2014 
t-statistic Heterogeneity Measures Mean SD Mean SD 
Racial Fractionalization 0.443 0.197 0.467 0.195 29.6 
Language Fractionalization 0.507 0.151 0.518 0.146 17. 9 
Gini Coefficient 0.442 0.067 0.451 0.064 32.4 
N 108,577 127,048  
  Decennial Census 2000 
Instrumental Variables Mean SD Max 
Fraction of households earning more 
than $200,000 in 2000 
0.026 0.049 0.639 
Fraction of workers employed in the 
public sector in 2000 
0.0476 0.0326 1 
Fraction of workers employed in the 
information industry in 2000 
0.0450 0.0332 1 
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Table 1.3: Summary statistics of control variables at the census tract level 
Socioeconomic Demographic Variables  
2005-2009 2010-2014 
t-statistic Mean SD Mean SD 
Population 4,207 2,154 3,953 2,167 -28.8 
Number of Households 1,560 1,005 1,466 969 -23.1 
Mean Household Income 71,624 41,652 78,638 44,911 39.06 
Median Household Income 53,830 26,342 58,540 28,626 41.30 
% population under 20 years of age 25.3 8.7 23.8 8.0 -44.2 
% population aged between 21 and 40 30.8 8.4 31.6 8.9 22.6 
% population aged between 41 and 65 31.5 5.9 31.8 6.0 12.7 
% population aged over 66 12.3 6.3 12.7 6.5 14.8 
% White population 46.4 31.5 43.5 30.3 -22.9 
% Black population 25.3 30.8 26.1 30.8 6.8 
% American Indian population 0.4 0.9 0.4 0.9 6.4 
% Asian population 11.8 14.9 13.3 16.3 23.6 
% Hawaiian or Pacific Islander population 0.03 0.2 0.04 0.3 9.8 
% some other race population28 14.1 16.0 13.6 15.5 -7.3 
%  population in civilian labor force 57.2 9.5 56.6 9.7 -16.3 
%  population unemployed 8.4 4.8 10.6 5.8 99.1 
% married households with at least one child 18.2 11.5 17.7 9.5 -10.9 
% owner occupied houses  36.9 25.14 36.5 25.18 -4.1 
% population 25 years or older with Bachelor's 
Degree or higher  30.7 20.1 32.5 20.3 21.9 
% of foreign born population 36.0 15.8 37.5 15.4 23.1 
% of households where English is not spoken 
at 46.4 22.7 47.6 22.6 13.6 
% of households in the same house last year 89.3 6.37 89.4 6.69 6.3 
N 108,577 127,048  
 
 
 
 
                                  
28 The ACS does not categorize Hispanic population. Hispanic population, along with residents who claim 
more than one races, are included in the some other race population variable. 
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Table 1.4: OLS and Fixed-Effects Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gini Coefficient -2.096*** -0.925*** -0.449** -0.469** 
 (0.148) (0.161) (0.191) (0.186) 
Racial Fractionalization -0.311*** -0.071 -0.103 -0.115 
 (0.061) (0.074) (0.089) (0.104) 
Linguistic 
Fractionalization 
0.111 0.0154 -0.092 -0.150 
 (0.074) (0.094) (0.096) (0.114) 
Log Population -0.472*** -0.411*** -0.726*** -0.711*** 
 (0.028) (0.051) (0.056) (0.061) 
Log Median Household 
Income 
0.181*** -0.054 -0.117*** -0.095*** 
 (0.025) (0.044) (0.04) (0.042) 
Observations 228,501 228,501 228,501 228,501 
R-squared 0.173 0.300 0.123 0.125 
F 141.5 11.41 194.0 59.89 
Tract FE No No Yes Yes 
Month-Year FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
 
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by census tract and year. The dependent variable is the inverse 
hyperbolic sine transformed per capita frequency of service requests about sewer blockage and street light 
outage. Racial and linguistic fractionalization  measures are calculated using the reverse the reverse 
Herfindahl–Hirschman formula. Controls are the time-varying variables listed in Table 3 and the fractions 
of workers in employed in each industry. *p < .10. **p < 0.05. ***p < .01.
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Table 1.5: 2SLS Results  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Gini Coefficient -2.335*** -4.927** -2.474*** -1.700** -2.977*** 
 (0.721) (2.480) (0.731) (0.793) (0.782) 
Racial Fractionalization -0.002 0.025 -0.001 -0.078 0.065 
 (0.084) (0.091) (0.084) (0.101) (0.095) 
Linguistic 
Fractionalization 
0.060 0.030 0.058 0.208 -0.025 
 (0.104) (0.113) (0.104) (0.124) (0.108) 
Log Population -0.366*** -0.282*** -0.364*** -0.260*** -0.389*** 
 (0.053) (0.072) (0.053) (0.051) (0.057) 
Log Median Household 
Income 
-0.173** -0.414** -0.186** -0.117 -0.247** 
(0.085) (0.235) (0.085) (0.089) (0.098) 
Observations 228,226 228,226 228,226 104,519 123,707 
R-squared 0.221 0.177 0.22 0.205 0.239 
F-stat 35.99 30.49 35.74 26.67 31.72 
First-stage F-stat 191.7 25.54 103.4 60.83 68.02 
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2000 Top Income IV Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
2000 Public Sector IV No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan-Hansen p-value - - 0.349 0.845 0.356 
Sample Full Full Full ACS1 ACS2 
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by census tract and year. The dependent variable is the inverse 
hyperbolic sine transformed per capita frequency of service requests about sewer blockage and street light 
outage. Racial and linguistic fractionalization  measures are calculated using the reverse the reverse 
Herfindahl–Hirschman formula. In column 1, the Gini coefficient is instrumented with the fraction of 
households with income greater than 200,000 dollars in 2000. In column 2, the Gini coefficient is 
instrumented with the fraction of working population employed in the public sector in 2000. Columns 3 
through 5 include both instruments. Controls are the time-varying variables listed in Table 3 and the 
fractions of workers in employed in each industry. *p < .10. **p < 0.05. ***p < .01. 
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Table 1.6: 2SLS Results with Alternative Request Types 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gini Coefficient -0.052 -1.831*** -1.478* -2.042*** 
 (0.164) (0.611) (0.799) (0.610) 
Racial Fractionalization -0.057 0.008 -0.050 0.050 
 (0.100) (0.090) (0.109) (0.100) 
Linguistic Fractionalization -0.089 -0.002 0.050 -0.036 
 (0.119) (0.111) (0.127) (0.124) 
Log Population -0.575*** -0.087* 0.093* 0.090* 
 (0.077) (0.044) (0.049) (0.045) 
Log Median Household 
Income 
-0.108** -0.372*** -0.362*** -0.371*** 
(0.045) (0.074) (0.091) (0.078) 
Observations 195886 195850 87428 108422 
R-squared 0.480 0.220 0.258 0.199 
F-stat 132.6 30.64 32.93 21.88 
First-stage F-stat  119.2 56.50 73.21 
Tract FE Yes No No No 
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2000 Top Income IV No Yes Yes Yes 
2000 Information Sector IV No Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan-Hansen p-value - 0.230 0.484 0.271 
Sample Full Full ACS1 ACS2 
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by census tract and year. The dependent is the inverse hyperbolic 
sine transformed frequency of service requests about power outage and heating complains. Racial and 
linguistic fractionalization  measures are calculated using the reverse the reverse Herfindahl–Hirschman 
formula. In columns 2 through 3, the Gini coefficient is instrumented with the fraction of households with 
income greater than 200,000 dollars in 2000 and the fraction of working population employed in the 
information industry in 2000. Controls are the time-varying variables listed in Table 3 and the fractions of 
workers in employed in each industry. *p < .10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01.
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Figure 1.1: Service Requests (height) and Income Inequality (shade) from 2010-2014 
 
 84 
 
Figure 1.2: Service Requests (height) and Racial Fractionalization (shade) from 2010-2014 
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Figure 1.3: Service Requests (height) and Language Fractionalization (shade) from 2010-2014
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Figure 1.4: Correlation Heat Map of Average Service Request Completion Time by Census Tract and Demographics 
 
Note: Font size indicates the strength of the correlation. Red indicates a negative correlation. Blue indicates a positive correlation. 
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Figure 1.5: Relationship between Service Requests and Instruments 
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Figure 1.6: Relationship between Gini Coefficient and Instruments 
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Diagram 1: Stages of Interview & Select 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STAGE 1: Schools Post Vacancies
STAGE 2: Existing MPS Teachers Apply
STAGE 3: Schools Review Resumés 
and Interview Short-listed Candidates
STAGE 4: Schools Submit Rank Order 
List of Candidates and Make Offers
STAGE 5: Teachers Accept or Decline 
Offers
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Table 2.1: I&S Applicants and Non-applicants from 2009-2015 
 Movers  Stayers Successful Applicants Unsuccessful Applicants 
Female 0.740 0.747 0.766 0.710 
Age 42.537 43.038 40.144 45.404 
Teacher of color 0.194 0.181 0.175 0.217 
Advanced degree 0.445 0.436 0.422 0.471 
Effectiveness (z-score)     
Composite -0.177 -0.005 -0.063 -0.328 
Value-added -0.061 0.002 -0.037 -0.094 
SOEI -0.199 0.009 -0.082 -0.353 
Student Surveys -0.070 -0.002 -0.0004 -0.171 
Experience     
Early Career (1-3 years) 0.160 0.119 0.186 0.129 
Mid Career (4-10 years) 0.180 0.140 0.201 0.154 
Late Career (10+ years) 0.492 0.512 0.412 0.588 
Sending-School Attributes     
Commute time (minutes) 18.4 16.9 18.2 18.6 
% teachers of color 15.3 14.6 15.2 15.4 
% students of color 78.5 71.2 77.7 79.6 
Avg. years of teacher experience 12.8 13.8 12.7 12.8 
% students proficient in reading 42.4 47.1 42.7 42.1 
% FRPL 78.6 69.5 77.8 79.6 
% ELL 27.2 25.9 27.0 27.4 
% SPED 20.7 18.2 20.6 20.9 
Total enrollment 615 706 619 611 
Pupil-teacher ratio 14.6 15.7 14.8 14.4 
Pupil-teacher aide ratio 42.6 51.4 43.6 41.4 
Priority status 0.130 0.074 0.131 0.128 
Receiving-School Attributes     
Commute time (minutes) 19.3  19.2 19.5 
% teachers of color 15.8  15.6 15.9 
% students of color 75.3  75.2 75.3 
Avg. years of teacher experience 13.2  13.1 13.2 
% students proficient in reading 46.5  46.6 46.4 
% FRPL 74.2  74.0 74.3 
% ELL 27.6  27.7 27.5 
% SPED 17.3  17.2 17.3 
Total enrollment 643  648 637 
Pupil-teacher ratio 15.4  15.5 15.4 
Pupil-teacher aide ratio 46.9  47.2 46.5 
Priority status 0.126  0.124 0.128 
Max Observations 2,934 23,006 1,592 1,341 
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Table 2.2: Teacher Preferences Results  
  (T1A) (T1B) (T2A) (T2B) (T3) (T4A) (T4B) 
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
in
 s
ch
o
o
l 
at
tr
ib
u
te
s 
 (
re
ce
iv
in
g
–
 s
en
d
in
g
) 
Avg. bonus 
amount 
0.000712*** 0.000722*** 0.000703*** 0.000708*** 0.000861*** 0.000852*** 0.000847*** 
(0.000210) (0.000210) (0.000210) (0.000210) (0.000060) (0.000061) (0.000061) 
Commute 
time  
-0.041692*** -0.041258*** -0.040347*** -0.040020*** -0.073102*** -0.072061*** -0.072391*** 
(0.003302) (0.003309) (0.003327) (0.003370) (0.003655) (0.003733) (0.003708) 
Priority 
status 
-0.122747 -0.128381 -0.127542 -0.130664 -0.297106*** -0.315122*** -0.302929*** 
(0.091040) (0.092408) (0.091755) (0.092022) (0.031961) (0.032310) (0.032085) 
Avg. teacher 
experience 
0.009898 0.009772 0.008655 0.008899 0.027688*** 0.026720*** 0.027009*** 
(0.012426) (0.012468) (0.012504) (0.012486) (0.004302) (0.004349) (0.004344) 
% students 
of color 
-0.005787 -0.005788 -0.008638* -0.008362* -0.005741*** -0.008926*** -0.008563*** 
(0.004549) (0.004571) (0.004686) (0.004632) (0.001950) (0.002062) (0.002057) 
% teachers 
of color 
-0.000427 -0.000225 -0.000383 -0.000325 -0.002757* -0.002537 -0.002677* 
(0.005335) (0.005376) (0.005339) (0.005351) (0.001589) (0.001607) (0.001600) 
% proficient 
in reading 
0.006656** 0.006480** 0.006969** 0.006678** 0.006156*** 0.006518*** 0.006484*** 
(0.003240) (0.003251) (0.003160) (0.003248) (0.000925) (0.000919) (0.000933) 
Enrollment 
0.000299** 0.000291** 0.000313** 0.000301** 0.000502*** 0.000512*** 0.000509*** 
(0.000141) (0.000138) (0.000142) (0.000139) (0.000040) (0.000041) (0.000041) 
Pupil-teacher 
ratio 
-0.035725** -0.036461** -0.036511** -0.037783** -0.071267*** -0.070629*** -0.071777*** 
(0.014506) (0.014439) (0.014976) (0.014759) (0.004851) (0.004975) (0.004960) 
% 
free/reduced 
price lunch 
0.002839 0.002548 0.003981 0.003309 -0.001184 0.000122 -0.000488 
(0.004770) (0.004831) (0.004846) (0.004842) (0.001743) (0.001821) (0.001818) 
% ELL 
-0.001326 -0.001434 -0.001077 -0.001221 -0.002647*** -0.002450** -0.002436** 
(0.003212) (0.003212) (0.003201) (0.003201) (0.000963) (0.000966) (0.000965) 
% SPED 
0.005713* 0.005928* 0.005884* 0.006032* 0.008713*** 0.008634*** 0.008722*** 
(0.003238) (0.003183) (0.003244) (0.003169) (0.001289) (0.001299) (0.001297) 
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Pupil-teacher 
aide ratio 
0.000358 0.000376 0.000381 0.000393 0.000512*** 0.000491*** 0.000524*** 
(0.000367) (0.000370) (0.000366) (0.000370) (0.000117) (0.000117) (0.000118) 
T
ea
ch
er
 c
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
Age 
-0.006826*** -0.007474*** -0.006719*** -0.007297***   
 
(0.001976) (0.001917) (0.001951) (0.001884)   
Female 
-0.221774*** -0.241228*** -0.227531*** -0.244677***    
(0.042192) (0.042793) (0.042952) (0.042834)   
Teacher of 
color 
-0.113029*** -0.113643*** -0.061841 -0.061686    
(0.039723) (0.039849) (0.039574) (0.039749)   
Advanced 
degree 
-0.028580 -0.037085 -0.020382 -0.031736    
(0.033897) (0.033126) (0.035510) (0.033980)   
Mid-career 
(4-10 years) 
-0.336968*** -0.333981*** -0.341111*** -0.335867***    
(0.057962) (0.056872) (0.058044) (0.056569)   
Late career 
(over 10 
years) 
-0.378946*** -0.370086*** -0.371535*** -0.366649***    
(0.053621) (0.053066) (0.053419) (0.052525)   
TE: Value-
added  
(z-score) 
-0.014946  -0.018445     
(0.040416)  (0.039768)    
TE: Student 
survey  
(z-score) 
-0.032681  -0.040182     
(0.026285)  (0.026764)    
TE: SOEI  
(z-score) 
-0.163376***  -0.171417***     
(0.031534)  (0.033825)    
TE: 
Composite  
(z-score) 
 -0.188266***  -0.204352***    
 (0.035822)  (0.036721)  
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 
te
ac
h
er
 c
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
 
an
d
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
in
 
sc
h
o
o
l 
at
tr
ib
u
te
s 
TE: SOEI X 
Pupil-teacher 
ratio 
  -0.002475   0.004304  
  (0.009123)   (0.005536)  
TE: SOEI X 
Avg. Bonus 
  0.000166*   0.000193** 
 
  (0.000087)   (0.000075)  
TE: SOEI X    -0.000973   0.000207  
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% proficient 
in reading 
  (0.001629)   (0.001037) 
 
TE: SOEI X  
% students of 
color 
  -0.005826***   -0.009427***  
  (0.001398)   (0.001175) 
 
Teacher of 
color X 
% students 
of color 
  0.009998*** 0.010151***  0.011047*** 0.011626*** 
  (0.001603) (0.001557)  (0.001579) (0.001572) 
TE: Composite X 
Pupil-teacher 
ratio 
   0.000081   0.000192** 
   (0.000088)  
 
(0.000087) 
TE: Composite X 
Avg. Bonus 
   -0.006167   -0.002913 
   (0.010365)   (0.006715) 
TE: Composite X  
% proficient 
in reading 
   0.000873   0.001588 
   (0.001554)  
 
(0.001189) 
TE: Composite X 
% students 
of color 
   -0.003864***   -0.007268*** 
   (0.001434)  
 
(0.001293) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Teacher FE N N N N Y Y Y 
Log-likelihood -165644.4 -165913.0 -165168.9 -165582.7 -130671.9 -129184.0 -129436.0 
Chi2 27414.9 26546.8 35819.3 27888.7 2366.5 6922.2 6628.9 
Observations 1,766,858 1,766,858 1,766,858 1,766,858 1,957,233 1,957,233 1,957,233 
 
Note: The dependent variable is a binary choice for teacher i whether to apply to a position at school j in year y. For models T1A-T2B, we use the logistic regression to estimate teacher preferences and 
the standard errors are clustered at the sending-school level. For models T3-T5, we use the conditional mixed logistic regression and the standard errors are clustered at the teacher level. The results are 
based on a subsample of all active MPS teachers who meet the licensure requirement for each position posted in I&S in each year. As such, teachers may have varying choice sets available to them. For 
teachers who do not participate in I&S, we assume that they choose their own school out of all other alternatives available to them. We also pool in information from the post-interview stage for 
teachers who received multiple job offers. Indicators for whether the observation is from the post-offer stage and from which round are included in all models. Estimates are reported in the log-odds 
format.  *p < .10. **p < 0.05. ***p < .01. 
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Table 2.3: Marginal Rates of Substitution Matrix 
 
Bonus 
(dollars) 
Commute 
Time 
(minutes) 
High-
priority 
school 
status 
Avg. 
teacher 
experience 
(year) 
% 
students 
of color 
% 
teachers 
of color 
Reading 
achievement 
(% 
proficient) 
Enrollment 
Pupil-
teacher 
ratio 
Bonus (dollars) -1 0.01 0 -0.03 0.14 0.25 -0.14 -1.87 0.01 
Commute Time 
(minutes) 
84.3 -1 -0.25 2.68 -11.9 -21.4 11.44 158 -1.15 
High-priority 
school status 
332 -3.94 -1 10.6 -47 -84.3 45 621 -4.52 
Avg. teacher 
experience (year) 
-31.4 0.37 0.09 -1 4.45 7.98 -4.26 -58.8 0.43 
% students of 
color 
7.06 -0.08 -0.02 0.22 -1 -1.79 0.96 13.2 -0.1 
% teachers of 
color 
3.94 -0.05 -0.01 0.13 -0.56 -1 0.53 7.37 -0.05 
Reading 
achievement  
(% proficient) 
-7.37 0.09 0.02 -0.23 1.04 1.87 -1 -13.8 0.1 
Enrollment -0.53 0.01 0 -0.02 0.08 0.14 -0.07 -1 0.01 
Pupil-teacher 
ratio 
73.5 -0.87 -0.22 2.34 -10.41 -18.66 9.97 138 -1 
 
Note: For each cell, we use the estimated preferences from column T3 of Table 1 to calculate the rate at which a teacher is ready to face a one unit increase in the column attribute in 
exchange for the row attribute while maintaining the same level of utility. Negative values indicate that the teacher must forgo the column attribute. For example, a high priority 
school status requires a reduction of 47 percentage points in the share of students of color to keep the predicted likelihood that an average teacher applies to that school constant. 
Although the magnitudes of the estimates shown above can be impractically large, a change in any attribute can be fully or partially neutralized by changing multiple attributes at the 
same time. Doing so gives the district the option to avoid changing non-malleable attributes or making an extremely large change in one single attribute. To neutralize the effect of a 
change in high priority school status, the district may decrease the number of students per teacher at that school by roughly 2.25 students and provide any applicant to that school a 
bonus of 116 dollars. Alternatively, the district can also just provide any applicant to that school a bonus of 332 dollars without altering the pupil-teacher ratio.
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Table 2.4: Characteristics of schools in the bottom and top quintiles of student 
reading proficiency 
School Attributes 
Mean at Schools 
in the Bottom 
Quintile 
Mean at Schools 
in 
the Top Quintile 
Difference 
% students proficient in 
reading 
22.5 81.8 -59.3 
% priority schools 0.24 0 24 
Enrollment 437 830 -393 
Avg. teacher experience, 
yrs 
10.9 17.4 -6.50 
% teachers of color 17.8 7.8 10 
% students of color 91.4 33.9 57.5 
% low-income students 89.0 27.9 61.1 
% ELL 25.9 7.44 18.5 
% Special education 32.8 11.3 21.5 
Pupil-teacher ratio 11.1 19.9 -8.80 
Pupil-teacher aide ratio 25.9 80.1 -54.2 
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Table 2.5: Change in bottom-quintile school characteristics required to create indifference between working in 
top-quintile and bottom-quintile school 
Type of Teacher 
 Change Required at 
Bottom Quintile School 
 
Cost to Change (per teacher) 
Pay 
(method 1) 
Pay 
(method 2) 
Pupil-
Teacher 
Ratio 
Pupil-Aide 
Ratio 
 
Pupil-Teacher Ratio 
 
Average teacher 
$746 
(354,1264) 
$658 
(387,880) 
-17.4 
(-19.9,-14.0) 
1,142 
(385,3106) 
 $45,496 
Effectiveness 1SD 
below average 
$67.0 
(-495,810) 
$47.8 
(-579,561) 
 
-9.38 
(-15.9,-0.87) 
 
32.8 
(-711,1960) 
 
$42,252 
Effectiveness 1SD 
above average 
$1,424 
(1203,1717) 
$1,269 
(1199,1354) 
-25.4 
(-27.2,-24.0) 
2,253 
(1481,4253) 
 
$45,496 
Teacher of color 
-$36.1 
(-514,597) 
-$45.0 
(-602,410) 
-8.16 
(-14.0,-0.57) 
-136 
(-736,1419) 
 
$36,757 
Note: To obtain the requisite changes, we divide the coefficients of school attributes from model T4B by the coefficient on each lever to obtain the marginal rates of substitution. Then, 
we multiply the vector of attribute differences shown in Table 4 with the corresponding marginal rates of substitution to obtain the requisite change in each lever for each attribute. For 
each lever, summing up all the requisite changes across all attributes yields the total requisite change to create indifference for an average teacher. For specific types of teachers, we 
obtain the differential change from the coefficients of the interaction terms. Method 1 uses pay-for-performance variation. Method 2 uses estimated cost of travel time ($22.9 per hour) 
that is established in the transportation literature and assumes 200 work days in a year. Cost to change pupil-teacher ratio is calculated using the average enrollment at bottom-quintile 
schools and assume that the total cost of hiring an additional teacher is $50,000 per year. When the resulting pupil-teacher ratio drops below zero, we use a ratio of one instead. 
Confidence intervals are included in parentheses. 
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Table 2.6: School Preferences Results 
 (S1A) (S1B) (S2A) (S2B) 
Age 
-0.020693*** -0.020704*** -0.020690*** -0.020700*** 
(0.002759) (0.002747) (0.002755) (0.002744) 
Female 
0.104905** 0.109752** 0.104691** 0.109528** 
(0.051508) (0.050946) (0.051576) (0.051025) 
Teacher of color 
-0.247915*** -0.246061*** -0.219973 -0.215099 
(0.059363) (0.059392) (0.154204) (0.156329) 
Holding an advanced 
degree 
0.158620*** 0.154168*** 0.158630*** 0.154174*** 
(0.057105) (0.056724) (0.057103) (0.056726) 
Mid-career (4-10 years) 
0.053051 0.060893 0.053122 0.060966 
(0.069116) (0.069605) (0.068973) (0.069457) 
Late-career (over 10 years) 
0.148065* 0.149136* 0.148398* 0.149485* 
(0.081075) (0.081153) (0.081000) (0.081056) 
Early offers candidate 
0.091804 0.081764 0.091978 0.081960 
(0.149591) (0.151511) (0.149747) (0.151662) 
Automatically interview 
1.296517*** 1.296620*** 1.296495*** 1.296598*** 
(0.053095) (0.053104) (0.053090) (0.053101) 
Average number of years at 
all previous schools 
0.072413*** 0.078991*** 0.072336*** 0.078901*** 
(0.018389) (0.017728) (0.018357) (0.017689) 
TE: SOEI (z-score) 
0.243779***  0.243753***  
(0.058059)  (0.058038)  
TE: Student survey (z-
score) 
0.110648*  0.110824*  
(0.057088)  (0.056895)  
TE: Value-added (z-score) 
0.053806  0.053626  
(0.066413)  (0.066179)  
TE: Composite (z-score) 
 0.289941***  0.289990*** 
 (0.055820)  (0.055839) 
Teacher of color X 
% student of color at 
receiving school 
  -0.000386 -0.000428 
  (0.001960) (0.001998) 
Log-likelihood -5691.0 -5695.9 -5691.0 -5695.9 
Chi2 2110.1 1763.3 2115.5 1765.8 
Observations 12,427 12,427 12,427 12,427 
 
Note: The above results are obtained from running rank-ordered logistic regressions where the receiving-schools are the decision makers. 
The choice sets are the pools of applications. For all models, the dependent variable is an ordered ranking from 1 to 4, where 1 is the 
highest ranking. Applicants who were screened out before the interview stage receive a censored ranking of zero. We omit automatic 
interview applicants who were not ranked in the top four because we cannot observe whether they were revealed preferred to other 
candidates who were not interviewed.  The difference between A and B variants of these models is we break down teacher effectiveness 
measures into the three sub-components in A and combine them in B. The effectiveness measures are the most recent rolling averages 
from the first year of work up to the year of application. For more information on the teacher effectiveness measures, see Appendix B. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level. *p < .10. **p < 0.05. ***p < .01. 
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Figure 2.1: Average School Characteristics at MPS (2009-2015) 
 
Note: The characteristics displayed above are the averages at the school level between 2009 and 2015. Teacher effectiveness is 
measured by a score composite that takes into account every type of available measure of effectiveness. 
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Figure 2.2: Evidence on Strategic Behavior  
 
Panel A: Test of Strategic Behavior among Teachers 
  
Panel B: Panel A: Test of Strategic Behavior among Schools 
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Figure 2.3: Average Applicant Effectiveness as a Function of Receiving-school Characteristics  
by Stage of I&S (2013-2015) 
 
Note: Average receiving-school characteristics are on the x-axes. Average applicant effectiveness among every teacher who applied to (orange) and those who were hired (blue) at each 
school at the end of the I&S process is on the y-axis. Teacher effectiveness is measured by a running average of the score composite that takes into account every type of available measure of 
effectiveness for each teacher from her first year at MPS up to the year of application. 
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Figure 2.4: Average Applicant Experience as a Function of Receiving-school Characteristics  
by Stages of I&S (2009-2015) 
 
Note: Average receiving-school characteristics are on the x-axes. Average applicant experience among every teacher who applied to (orange) and those who were hired (blue) at each school 
at the end of the I&S process is on the y-axis.  
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Figure 2.5: Average Size of the Application Pool as a Function of Receiving-school Characteristics (2009-2015) 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Test Takers within 5 Miles from Major Airports in Texas (2003-2008) 
Variable DFW Austin IAH Hobby San Antonio Texas ex.DFW 
Pre Post  Pre Post  Pre Post  Pre Post  Pre Post  Pre Post  
# test takers 
136 136 93 100 235 209 136 148 120 136 114 118 
118 119 95 105 193 219 143 163 136 144 130 134 
Fraction black 
0.13 0.15 0.20 0.18 0.31 0.39 0.29 0.29 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.14 
0.13 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.33 0.32 0.16 0.14 0.21 0.20 
Fraction 
Hispanic 
0.21 0.26 0.73 0.76 0.41 0.43 0.63 0.65 0.55 0.59 0.40 0.43 
0.14 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.32 0.31 0.25 0.25 0.32 0.32 
Fraction white 
0.55 0.47 0.066 0.050 0.25 0.15 0.057 0.037 0.31 0.27 0.43 0.40 
0.24 0.25 0.071 0.056 0.19 0.15 0.081 0.053 0.23 0.22 0.33 0.32 
Fraction econ. 
disadvantaged 
0.31 0.39 0.81 0.85 0.61 0.67 0.80 0.82 0.56 0.60 0.54 0.56 
0.23 0.26 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.27 
Fraction ESL 
0.059 0.070 0.061 0.072 0.073 0.083 0.046 0.042 0.013 0.020 0.043 0.047 
0.061 0.063 0.070 0.094 0.067 0.069 0.070 0.063 0.031 0.033 0.083 0.083 
Fraction gifted 
0.14 0.14 0.066 0.057 0.082 0.054 0.060 0.073 0.067 0.082 0.10 0.094 
0.010 0.080 0.052 0.046 0.048 0.048 0.064 0.069 0.072 0.073 0.10 0.099 
Fraction female 
0.50 0.50 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
0.055 0.068 0.071 0.074 0.055 0.062 0.073 0.069 0.096 0.074 0.10 0.088 
Fraction male 
0.50 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
0.055 0.068 0.071 0.074 0.055 0.063 0.073 0.068 0.096 0.074 0.10 0.088 
Scores 
2255 2301 2147 2181 2178 2193 2166 2208 2194 2254 2204 2254 
93 100 82 90 77 99 93 85 111 102 99 97 
N 440 456 504 524 200 311 1172 1100 1110 1075 117732 122492 
 
Note: Post-closure is defined as being after January 1st, 2006. Mean values are presented on the top row of each variable with standard deviation underneath. The means that are statistically 
different at 5% significance level between pre and post periods are bolded.
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Table 3.2: Difference-in-Differences Results by Outcome and Comparison Group 
 
Austin IAH Hobby 
San 
Antonio 
Airports 
Aggregat
e 
Texas 
ex.DFW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Scores 
0.028*** 0.01 0.023** 0.020** 0.023*** 0.016* 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.01) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Passing rate 
0.712 -0.061 -0.168 0.596 0.389 -0.007 
(0.953) (0.8) (0.775) (0.757) (0.576) (0.458) 
Commende
d 
performance 
rate 
7.271*** 4.110*** 6.585*** 3.665*** 5.551*** 3.969*** 
(1.356) (1.404) (1.666) (1.387) (1.485) (1.485) 
Absence 
rate 
0.100 -0.497** -0.347** -0.002 -0.172 -0.122 
(0.174) (0.237) (0.153) (0.135) (0.119) (0.135) 
N 1,924 1,407 3,178 3,079 9,588 240,987 
 
Note: All models include day-of-week, year-grade, school-grade, and month fixed effects. Other controls include characteristics of the 
composition of test takers on each test date. Scores are in z-values while the rest of the outcomes are in percentage. In columns 1-5, 
observations with larger number of test takers and with location closer to airports receive more weight. Observations with larger 
number of test takers receive more weight in column 6. Standard errors are clustered at the campus level in parentheses. *p < .10. **p 
< 0.05. ***p < .01. 
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Table 3.3: Results by Outcome, Comparison Group, and Level of Education 
 
 Austin IAH Hobby 
San 
Antonio 
Airports 
Aggregate 
Texas 
ex.DFW 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A:  
 
 High 
school 
Scores 
0.028*** 0.036*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.038*** 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
Passing rate 
-0.379 1.65 1.878 2.615 2.195 1.965 
(1.22) (2.031) (2.434) (2.253) (1.928) (1.645) 
Commended 
performance 
rate 
7.743*** 8.331*** 9.432*** 7.988*** 8.694*** 6.909*** 
(1.176) (0.692) (1.611) (1.267) (1.486) (2.168) 
N 
240 193 400 436 1,269 37,452 
Panel B:   
 
Elementary 
school 
Scores 
0.033*** 0.022* 0.012 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.012 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Passing rate 
5.208*** 3.012** 0.892 1.763** 2.287*** 0.800 
(1.303) (1.175) (1.069) (0.701) (0.75) (0.626) 
Commended 
performance 
rate 
3.838*** 3.541*** 3.398*** 2.943** 3.496*** 2.281** 
(1.112) (1.28) (1.216) (1.213) (1.051) (1.024) 
N 
830 612 1,446 1,257 4,145 91,839 
 
Note: Observations from grade 9 to 10 and from grade 3 to 4 are included in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. All models 
include day-of-week, year-grade, school-grade, and month fixed effects. Other controls include characteristics of the composition 
of test takers on each test date. Scores are in z-values while the rest of the outcomes are in percentage. In columns 1-5, 
observations with larger number of test takers and with location closer to airports receive more weight. Observations with larger 
number of test takers receive more weight in column 6. Standard errors are clustered at the campus level in parentheses. *p < .10. 
**p < 0.05. ***p < .01. 
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Table 3.4: Robustness Check with Unit-specific Time Trends 
 
Austin IAH Hobby San Antonio 
Airports 
Aggregate 
Texas 
ex.DFW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Scores 0.029*** 0.018* 0.021** 0.011 0.019** 0.016* 
(0.0090) (0.010) (0.010) (0.0090) (0.008) (0.0090) 
Passing Rate 
1.137 0.204 0.924 0.523 0.877 -0.016 
(1.124) (1.337) (1.074) (1.074) (0.929) (0.457) 
Commended 
performance 
rate 
3.189*** 2.216* 2.346** 1.651 2.314** 3.982*** 
(1.208) (1.196) (1.128) (1.118) (1.03) (1.485) 
N 1,924 1,407 3,178 3,079 9,588 240,987 
 
Note: The difference between the models in this table and the models used to generate Table 2 is the inclusion of unit-specific time 
trends. I include an interaction term between time trend and being near DFW. All models include day-of-week, year-grade, school-
grade, and month fixed effects. Other controls include characteristics of the composition of test takers on each test date. Scores are in 
z-values while the rest of the outcomes are in percentage. In columns 1-5, observations with larger number of test takers and with 
location closer to airports receive more weight. Observations with larger number of test takers receive more weight in column 6. 
Standard errors are clustered at the campus level in parentheses. *p < .10. **p < 0.05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
Table 3.5: Robustness Check with Placebo Treatment 
 
Austin IAH Hobby San Antonio 
Airports 
Aggregate 
Texas 
ex.DFW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Scores 
-0.017** -0.008 -0.01 0.003 -0.006 -0.001 
(0.008) (0.01) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.01) 
Passing Rate 
-0.917 0.654 -0.163 -0.041 -0.324 0.403 
(0.961) (1.249) (0.975) (0.686) (0.682) (0.838) 
Commended 
performance 
rate 
1.384 1.235 0.44 1.013 0.781 0.469 
(0.91) (1.083) (0.856) (0.89) (0.772) (1.023) 
N 626 420 1,080 1,028 3,154 78,247 
 
Note: Treatment year in these regressions is redefined as 2004 instead of 2006. Unrelated outcome variable is randomly generated. All 
models include day-of-week, year-grade, school-grade, and month fixed effects. Other controls include characteristics of the 
composition of test takers on each test date. Scores are in z-values while the rest of the outcomes are in percentage. In columns 1-5, 
observations with larger number of test takers and with location closer to airports receive more weight. Observations with larger 
number of test takers receive more weight in column 6. Standard errors are clustered at the campus level in parentheses. *p < .10. **p 
< 0.05. ***p < .01. 
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Figure 3.1: Monthly Pollution Averages around DFW by Pollutant 
 
Note: Monthly pollution averages from the closest monitor to the airport are regressed on month fixed effects to reduce the effects of 
seasonality. The residuals are plotted over time. 
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Figure 3.2: Monthly Pollution Averages around DFW Relative to the Rest of Texas 
by Pollutant 
 
Note: Monthly pollution averages from the closest monitor to the airport are regressed on month fixed effects to reduce the effects of 
seasonality. The residuals are plotted over time. 
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Appendices 
Table A.1: Policy Changes Affecting I&S from 2009 to 2015 
Time Policy change at all schools 
2009-1st round of 
2011 
1. External and early-contract candidates: External candidates only enter after I&S. No 
early-contracts. 
2. Seniority: During I&S, schools must interview top 5 most-senior applicants. They then 
have the option to interview up to 5 other candidates as desired. 
3. Forced excessing: Any teacher hired into a contract position between February 1 and the 
start of I&S is “force excessed” so that the vacancy becomes available for I&S. Sites still 
have the ability to interview the person they had hired and select them for the vacancy but 
are forced to participate in I&S. 
4. Forced placements: if internal candidates are excessed due to budget cuts and do not 
secure a position through I&S, the district places them into whatever open position for 
which they qualify. 
2nd round of 2011-
2012 
1. External and early-contract candidates: Early-contract candidates begin to participate in 
I&S with greater frequency. They participate in the process with no seniority. 
2. Seniority: No change. 
3. Forced excessing: No change. 
4. Forced placement: No change. 
July 2013 
1. External and early-contract candidates: No change. 
2. Seniority: During I&S, schools must interview top 4 most senior applicants. Sites then 
have the option to interview up to 4 other internal and early-contract applicants. 
3. Forced excessing: Post-Feb 1 hires are not automatically force excessed at priority sites. 
4. Forced placement: No forced placement of staff at Priority Schools. 
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Table A.2: Integrity of I&S Rules 
 
 
Year Number of applicants within a posting 
<=5 applicants 6-10 applicants 11+ applicants 
 Share of postings  
interviewing all 5 
most senior 
applicants 
Share of postings  
interviewing all 5 
most senior 
applicants 
Share of 
applicants with 
seniority below 
cutoff 
interviewed 
Share of  
postings  
interviewing all 
5 most senior 
applicants 
Share of applicants with 
seniority below cutoff 
interviewed 
2009 0.99 0.94 0.68 1.00 0.62 
2010 0.97 0.90 0.80 0.89 0.49 
2011 0.99 0.97 0.84 0.88 0.44 
2012 0.97 0.88 0.68 0.98 0.36 
2013 0.95 0.91 0.59 0.91 0.35 
 <=4 applicants 5-8 applicants 9+ applicants 
 Share of  postings  
interviewing all 4 
most senior 
applicants 
Share of  postings  
interviewing all 4 
most senior 
applicants 
Share of 
applicants with 
seniority below 
cutoff 
interviewed 
Share of  
postings  
interviewing all 
4 most senior 
applicants 
Share of applicants with 
seniority below cutoff 
interviewed 
2014 0.91 0.85 0.74 0.91 0.31 
2015 0.92 0.88 0.69 0.82 0.30 
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Table A.3: Estimating School Preferences Separately by Stage 
 
Note: In models S3A and S3B, the dependent variable is a binary choice for school j whether to send an interview invitation to teacher 
i given that it receives an application from teacher i. S3A and S3B are estimated using the conditional mixed logistic regression with 
position fixed effects. In models S4A and S4B, the dependent variable is an ordered ranking from 1 to 4, where 1 is the highest 
ranking. S4A and S4B are estimated using the rank-ordered logistic regression. The difference between A and B variants of these 
models is we break down teacher effectiveness measures into the three sub-components in A and combine them in B. The 
effectiveness measures are the most recent rolling averages. For more information on the teacher effectiveness measures, see 
Appendix B. Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level. *p < .10. **p < 0.05. ***p < .01. 
 
 (S3A) (S3B) (S4A) (S4B) 
 Resume-screening Stage Interview Stage 
Age 
-0.012678*** -0.012699*** -0.034634*** -0.034611*** 
(0.003906) (0.003807) (0.002777) (0.002734) 
Female 
0.135363 0.139177 0.163556*** 0.165877*** 
(0.100973) (0.101046) (0.056531) (0.056856) 
Teacher of color 
-0.255363*** -0.254465*** -0.223474*** -0.219846*** 
(0.089979) (0.090128) (0.065743) (0.067663) 
Holding an advanced degree 
0.258618*** 0.260104*** 0.115389** 0.119986** 
(0.083229) (0.083800) (0.057103) (0.057173) 
Mid-career (4-10 years) 
0.181186* 0.197748* 0.087090 0.097859 
(0.104481) (0.105528) (0.071488) (0.071360) 
Late-career (over 10 years) 
0.675741*** 0.667834*** 0.032576 0.047909 
(0.131232) (0.127168) (0.087667) (0.087881) 
Early offers candidate 
0.149979 0.188811 0.248711* 0.267937* 
(0.118485) (0.118123) (0.144682) (0.140355) 
Automatic interview 
-2.21e+01*** -2.18e+01*** -0.181185*** -0.193052*** 
(0.173325) (0.175698) (0.065031) (0.064286) 
Average number of years at 
all previous schools 
0.134195*** 0.141726*** 0.009312 0.015746 
(0.036815) (0.036330) (0.016851) (0.016262) 
TE: SOEI (z-score) 
0.071434  0.305244***  
(0.091021)  (0.058867)  
TE: Student survey (z-
score) 
0.249266***  0.071149  
(0.096197)  (0.055708)  
TE: Value-added (z-score) 
0.000169  -0.122715**  
(0.106633)  (0.057236)  
TE: Composite (z-score) 
 0.127125*  0.277073*** 
 (0.066388)  (0.049044) 
Log-likelihood -2633.8 -2638.7 -5747.6 -5759.9 
Chi2 20232.1 18223.9 548.6 399.9 
Observations 11,440 11,440 9,899 9,899 
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Table A.4: Estimating School Preferences using Alternative Ranking 
 (S5A) (S5B) (S6A) (S6B) 
Age 
-0.016293*** -0.016310*** -0.016307*** -0.016323*** 
(0.002123) (0.002117) (0.002117) (0.002111) 
Female 
0.096387** 0.102267** 0.095306** 0.101218** 
(0.046711) (0.046733) (0.046628) (0.046641) 
Teacher of color 
-0.241498*** -0.239603*** -0.140962 -0.141358 
(0.043327) (0.043467) (0.132165) (0.134589) 
Holding an advanced degree 
0.167376*** 0.163795*** 0.167278*** 0.163676*** 
(0.052908) (0.053401) (0.052937) (0.053434) 
Mid-career (4-10 years) 
0.114684* 0.122872* 0.115087* 0.123314* 
(0.065334) (0.066067) (0.065073) (0.065779) 
Late-career (over 10 years) 
0.208567*** 0.210248*** 0.209802*** 0.211448*** 
(0.066856) (0.065951) (0.066689) (0.065755) 
Early offers candidate 
0.125611 0.139175* 0.126000 0.139682* 
(0.080771) (0.083128) (0.080750) (0.083094) 
Automatically interview 
0.822628*** 0.823616*** 0.822795*** 0.823778*** 
(0.053634) (0.053595) (0.053595) (0.053560) 
Average number of years at 
all previous schools 
0.092872*** 0.098137*** 0.092661*** 0.097929*** 
(0.018314) (0.017941) (0.018341) (0.017965) 
TE: SOEI (z-score) 
0.122951***  0.123007***  
(0.045759)  (0.045719)  
TE: Student survey (z-
score) 
0.119142**  0.119790**  
(0.049362)  (0.049294)  
TE: Value-added (z-score) 
0.049634  0.048744  
(0.063436)  (0.063172)  
TE: Composite (z-score) 
 0.155379***  0.155574*** 
 (0.042798)  (0.042817) 
Teacher of color X 
% student of color at 
receiving school 
  -0.001386 -0.001355 
  (0.001617) (0.001660) 
Log-likelihood -8044.5 -8051.3 -8044.2 -8051.0 
Chi2 1007.1 896.5 1078.3 942.9 
Observations 12,427 12,427 12,427 12,427 
 
Note: The above results are obtained from running rank-ordered logistic regressions where the receiving-schools are the decision makers. 
The choice sets are the pools of applications. For all models, the dependent variable is an ordered ranking from 1 to 4, where 1 is the 
highest ranking. Applicants who were screened out before the interview stage receive a censored ranking of zero. Automatic interview 
applicants who were not ranked in the top are assigned the maximum ranking within the pool plus one. If there is more than one such 
applicant, they all will share this rank. The difference between A and B variants of these models is we break down teacher effectiveness 
measures into the three sub-components in A and combine them in B. The effectiveness measures are the most recent rolling averages 
from the first year of work up to the year of application. For more information on the teacher effectiveness measures, see Appendix B. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level. *p < .10. **p < 0.05. ***p < .01. 
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Figure A.1: Total Number of Applications by Year 
 
Figure A.2: Total Number of Unique Applicants by Year 
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Figure A.3: Number of Postings by Year 
 
Figure A.4: Average Size of Application Pool by Year 
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Appendix B:  
The district uses these measures to operationalize teacher effectiveness as three first- 
order factors measured at different times: 1) sound instructional practices (SOEI), 2) 
student engagement and perspectives of instruction, and 3) value added by a teacher to 
student academic growth. The value-added scores use teacher-verified rosters and 
measure the average contribution to student test score growth. This calculation uses 
modeling that accounts for pre-test achievement and other student characteristics are 
exogenous sources of construct-irrelevant variance in post-test scores.29 In short, the 
model isolates the progress each teacher’s students make on state mandated standardized 
tests relative to other students who had similar pre-test scores. The student surveys are a 
version of the surveys designed by Ronald Ferguson (cite).30 The survey is administered 
twice each year and ask K-12 students about the degree to which their teachers 
academically “engage” (3-8 items depending on grade level), “illuminate” (3-7 items), 
“manage” (3-6 items), “relate” (3-7 items), and “stretch” (3-7 items) them and their peers. 
The formal observations are conducted by a supervisor or other trained raters and use 
version of the rubric developed by Charlotte Danielson to measure effective teaching 
(cite).31 The rubric specifies sound instructional practices in terms of three domains: 
planning and preparation (seven items), classroom environment (five items), and (nine 
items). 
 
 
                                  
29 The overall reliability of value-added scores varies considerably by grade from about 0.75-0.90 for math 
and 0.44- 0.86 for reading. The reliability/standard error of measurement of an individual teacher’s score 
depends on the number of students taught and the proportion of variation in post-test scores explained by 
the control variables. 
30 2 Student surveys are scored using generalizability theory. Generalizability theory is appropriate because 
the design is balanced and students qualify as rater facets (but for whom reliable estimates of rater effects 
are not possible, in contrast to observer effects). The overall reliability of student survey scores is about 
0.81 in grades K-2, 0.82 in 3-5, and 0.90 in 6-12. The reliability/standard error of measurement of an 
individual teacher’s score depends on the number of students and items. 
31 Classroom observations are scored using the many-facets Rasch rating scale model. The many-facets 
Rasch model is used because it accommodates the highly unbalanced design (i.e., missingness due to short 
observations) and adjusts for variation in item difficulty and rater severity. Additionally, estimates of rater 
effects enable us to identify extreme and/or misfitting observers who need additional training. The overall 
reliability of observation scores is about 0.87. The reliability/standard error of measurement of an 
individual teacher’s score depends on the number of observations, raters and items. 
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Appendix C: 
Derivation of Marginal Rates of Substitution 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝜷(𝑿𝑘𝑦 − 𝑿𝑗𝑦) + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑦 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝜷𝑫𝑗𝑘𝑦 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑦 
𝑑𝑈𝑖 = (𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝐷1,𝑗𝑘𝑦⁄ )𝑑𝐷1,𝑗𝑘𝑦 + ⋯ + (𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝐷𝑚,𝑗𝑘𝑦⁄ )𝑑𝐷𝑚,𝑗𝑘𝑦 
𝑑𝑈𝑖 𝑑𝐷1,𝑗𝑘𝑦 =⁄ (𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝐷1,𝑗𝑘𝑦⁄ ) + (𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝐷2,𝑗𝑘𝑦⁄ )
𝑑𝐷2,𝑗𝑘𝑦
𝑑𝐷1,𝑗𝑘𝑦
+ ⋯ + (𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝐷𝑚,𝑗𝑘𝑦⁄ )
𝑑𝐷𝑚,𝑗𝑘𝑦
𝑑𝐷1,𝑗𝑘𝑦
 
0 = 𝑀𝑈𝐷1 + 𝑀𝑈𝐷2
𝑑𝐷2,𝑗𝑘𝑦
𝑑𝐷1,𝑗𝑘𝑦
+ ⋯ + 𝑀𝑈𝐷𝑚
𝑑𝐷𝑚,𝑗𝑘𝑦
𝑑𝐷1,𝑗𝑘𝑦
 
If we allow only attributes 1 and 2 to change (𝑑𝐷𝑛,𝑗𝑘𝑦 = 0 for all 𝑛 > 2)  
−
𝑀𝑈𝐷1
𝑀𝑈𝐷2
=
𝑑𝐷2,𝑗𝑘𝑦
𝑑𝐷1,𝑗𝑘𝑦
 
𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐷1,𝐷2 =
𝑀𝑈𝐷1
𝑀𝑈𝐷2
 
𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐷1,𝐷2 =
𝛽1
𝛽2
 
𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐷1,𝐷2  is the rate at which a teacher is ready to give up some amount of school 
attribute 1 in exchange for some amount of school attribute 2 while maintaining the same 
level of utility. 
 
